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I. INTRODUCTION 
Amakudari – literally “descent from heaven” – is a Japanese 
term used to refer to the practice of government officials retiring 
into industries and institutions, often those that they have 
formerly been involved in regulating. It is a practice that is 
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sometimes described as an endemic feature of the Japanese 
“system.”1 One study goes so far as to describe amakudari as the 
“hidden fabric” of the country’s economy.2 It is also a subject 
that has been the focus of a prolonged political battle between 
elected politicians seeking to end this form of institutional 
nepotism (or at least trying to appear to be fighting the 
bureaucrats for the benefit of voters), and bureaucrats preserving 
various techniques that result in the practice taking on new 
forms.  
Despite being a commonly identified feature of Japan’s 
political economy, formal research specifically on the subject of 
amakudari within Japan is surprisingly sparse, according to one 
Japanese scholar.3 Moreover, the subject tends to be discussed in 
terms of bureaucrats using their authority to spend tax money as 
a means of securing post-retirement sinecures, i.e., the economic 
impact of amakudari.4 Yet the exercise of authority involved in 
implementing amakudari generally requires a legal basis. 
However, the role and impact of amakudari on the functioning of 
the Japanese legal system and the way in which legal institutions 
have developed does not appear to have been given much 
consideration. Amakudari is frequently accomplished through 
  
 * Professor, Doshisha University Law School LL.M. Tohoku 
University, J.D. and LL.M. Duke University School of Law. All translations of 
Japanese source materials have been provided by the author unless otherwise 
noted.  
 1   See, e.g., BRIAN WOODALL, JAPAN UNDER CONSTRUCTION (1996), 
40-41, 68-78, 125-26, 130-39; CHALMERS JOHNSON, The Reemployment of 
Retired Government Bureaucrats in Japanese Big Business, JAPAN: WHO 
GOVERNS? (1995), Chalmers Johnson, On Official Bureaucracy id., at 133-138, 
141-56; KARL VAN WOLFEREN, THE ENIGMA OF JAPANESE POWER (1989), 113-
19, 122-24.  
 2. See generally RICHARD COLIGNON & CHIKAKO USUI, AMAKUDARI: 
THE HIDDEN FABRIC OF JAPAN’S ECONOMY (2003) (describing the role of 
Amukadari in the Japanese economy). 
 3. MASASHI NAKANO, AMAKUDARI NO KENKYŪ [THE STUDY OF 
AMAKUDARI] 24 (2009) (Japan). 
 4. See, e.g., WOODALL, supra note 1 (describing Japanese Ministry of 
Construction). KAZUHITO YAMASHITA, NŌKYŌ NO INBŌ [THE AGRICULTURAL 
COOPERATIVE CONSPIRACY] 158-59 (2011) (Japan). 
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law and regulations, which are often drafted by the same 
bureaucrats who benefit from it. Amakudari should thus be an 
identifiable feature of the legal system as well as the economy. 
Accordingly, this article will seek to introduce some of the ways 
in which amakudari may play a largely hidden role in Japanese 
law and legal institutions.  
This article will not delve deeply into the causes, utility, 
merits or comparative aspects of amakudari, a subject that has 
been looked at by other scholars in any case. 5  Furthermore, 
although there are more specific terms for particular modalities, 
this article will only use the term amakudari as a general term 
that refers to all of them.6 The author believes that such usage is 
consistent with amakudari as it is used in common parlance in 
Japan, as a reference to all forms of post-retirement employment 
by public employees in situations where the relevant government 
agency is likely able to directly or indirectly use its position to 
facilitate or structure such employment on preferential terms. 
While this article will not seek to consider or develop formal 
definitions of amakudari, in passing the author would offer 
“structured post-retirement employment for public servants” as 
one possible candidate.  
Additionally, although most literature on the subject focuses 
primarily on amakudari by elite bureaucrats from the national 
government, this article will use the term generally to refer to 
structured post-retirement employment at all levels of the 
  
 5. See, e.g., COLIGNON & USUI, supra note 2, at 38-43 (giving an 
overview of the various theories of the causes and potential merits of 
amakudari).  
 6. See, e.g., Colignon & Usui distinguish between amakudari (“the 
movement from ministry or agency to a private business”), yokosuberi 
(bureaucrats moving “into public corporations or special legal entities”), 
wataridori (“serial retirements in the public and/or private sector”) and 
seikaitensin (bureaucrats moving “into the political world, chiefly by becoming 
candidates for election to the Diet”). COLIGNON & USUI, supra note 2, at 11. 
This article essentially uses amakudari as a blanket descriptor for the first three 
types of career transitions. Nakano also notes a wide variety of definitions of 
amakudari exist. NAKANO, supra note 3, at 23-33. 
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national public service.7 As will be shown, some of Japan’s legal 
professions may function as a form of amakudari for a wide 
range of ex-bureaucrats below the high-fliers who garner most of 
the attention (and criticism). In this light the description of 
amakudari as “a kind of colonization of the public and private 
sectors by the ministries” 8  seems particularly apt; colonial 
systems involved both high level administrators and low level 
functionaries, all of whom enjoyed a privileged status compared 
to the much greater colonized population.  
After a general discussion of the amakudari, this article will 
discuss how it may affect the Japanese legal system in four 
principle contexts: (1) the private sector, (2) quasi-private 
foundations and other institutions, (3) the private sector legal 
professions and (4) governmental legal professions.  
II. THE INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
A number of features of Japanese bureaucracies and their role 
in the legal system need to be discussed in order to understand 
how amakudari may be a factor in it. First, most categories of 
national public servants are subject to mandatory retirement at a 
specific age. For most that age has long been 60. 9  Judges, 
  
 7. Japan has a two-tiered public service, with local public servants 
being subject to rules based on the national standard, subject to such 
modifications as are applied by local government ordinances. Chihōkōmuinhō 
[Local Public Service Act], Law no. 261 of 1950, Art. 82-2 (Japan). Amakudari 
by local government officials does occur but will not be discussed.  
 8. COLIGNON & USUI, supra note 2, at 51.  
 9. Kokkakōmuinhō [National Public Service Act], Law No. 120 of 
1947, arts. 81-2(2) (Japan), English translation available at Japanese Law 
Translation, MINISTRY OF JUST., (Apr. 1, 2009) 
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=2141&vm=04&re=02. 
The website of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC), 
which has partial jurisdiction over the public service, contains a useful list of 
retirement age of national government workers, giving 60 as the retirement age 
for most. Exceptions include Vice Ministers (typically the top bureaucrat in 
each Minister) who retire at 62, security guards, consular employees, and 
certain other special categories who retire at 63, and heads of national research 
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however, have a higher age of 65, or 70 for Supreme Court 
justices and summary court judges.10 Under the National Public 
Service Act, non-judicial court employees of various types are 
designated as “special service” public servants.11 For the most 
part, they are subject to the same mandatory retirement age of 60 
as other national public servants (subject again to the recently-
introduced system of reemployment in non-managerial positions 
until the age of 65).12 As is discussed later, the court system also 
employs a variety of specialized public servants – some on a 
part-time basis - who are subject to a higher mandatory 
  
institutions and doctors at national hospitals who retire at 65. Retirement Ages, 
MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFF. & COMM., http://www.soumu.go.jp/main_sosiki 
/jinji/jinji_04d.html (Japan) (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). Because the payment  
commencement date for public pensions is being transitioned from 60 to 65, 
there is now a program enabling national public servants to apply to be re-
employed during the period in which they would otherwise have no income. 
Public employees re-employed in this manner essentially take a pay cut, cease 
to hold managerial positions and are ineligible for promotions. See Public 
Employee Retirement, NAT’L PERS. AUTH. (NPA), http://www.jinji.go.jp/ 
shougai-so-go-joho/work/ (Japan) (last visited Mar. 1, 2014); Public Employee 
Pensions, NPA, http://www.jinji.go.jp/shougai-so-go-joho/work/pay.html (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2014); Public Employee Allowance, NPA, 
http://www.jinji.go.jp/shougai-so-go-joho/work/allowance.html (Japan) (giving 
program descriptions) (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). The descriptions for the age 
at which public pension payments commence is also described online. Ages for 
Pension Eligibility, JAPAN PENSION SERV., http://www.nenkin.go.jp/n/www 
/yougo/detail.jsp?id=125 (Japan) (last visited Mar. 1, 2014); Overview of the 
Public Pension System, FED’N NAT’L PUB. SERVICE PERSONNEL MUTUAL AID 
ASS’NS., http://www.kkr.or.jp/nenkin/seido/aramashi/index.html (last visited 
Mar. 1, 2014). 
 10. Saibanshōhō [Courts Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 50., English 
translation available at http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/? 
re=01&dn=1&x=0&y=0&co=1&yo=&gn=&sy=&ht=&no=&bu=&ta=&ky=%
E8%A3%81%E5%88%A4%E6%89%80%E6%B3%95&page=7 (Japan) (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
 11. Kokkakōmuinhō [National Public Service Act], Law No. 120 of 
1947, art. 2(3)(xiii) (Japan), English translation available at Japanese Law 
Translation, MINISTRY OF JUST., (Apr. 1, 2009), http://www.japaneselaw 
translation.go.jp/law/detail/?ft=1&re=01&dn=1&x=0&y=0&co=01&ky=%E5
%9B%BD%E5%AE%B6%E5%85%AC%E5%8B%99%E5%93%A1%E6%B3
%95&page=5. 
 12. Id. 
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retirement age, typically 70.13 Finally, it should be noted that 
prosecutors must retire at 63, except for the Supreme Prosecutor 
for whom the age of retirement is set at 65. 14  The average 
Japanese person can now expect to live until around the age of 
80 if not beyond.15 The mandatory retirement age thus leaves 
career public servants with the prospect of funding fifteen to 
twenty more years of life, ideally with more than just their 
pension.  
Another feature of the national public service is that it is 
based on “lifetime employment” in the classical Japanese model. 
The typical career path for a bureaucrat would start with a 
university student passing one of the national public service 
exams and joining one of the ministries, agencies or other central 
government administrative institutions (for simplicity this article 
will refer simply to them collectively as “ministries”) after 
graduation.16 There are a variety of categories of national public 
  
 13. Examples would be court enforcement officers (shikkōkan) and 
family court mediators (chōteiin).  
 14. Kensatuchōhō [Public Prosecutors Office Act], Law No. 61 of 
1947, art. 22 (Japan). Note that although despite being subordinate to the 
Ministry of Justice, it is widely acknowledged that prosecutors actually control 
the Ministry. This can readily ascertained by the fact that at any given time 
most bureau chiefs within the Ministry are from the prosecutorial service. As a 
result, unlike most other ministries in which the Vice Minister is the top career 
official, in the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) it is the Supreme Prosecutor. As 
described by former prosecutor and Minister of Justice Toshio Ogawa, “In the 
Ministry of Justice, most top leadership posts starting with the vice minister 
and chief cabinet secretary are occupied by prosecutors. And the top 
prosecutorial job is that of supreme prosecutor. Unlike other ministries and 
agencies, the vice minister is merely another post on the way to becoming 
Supreme Prosecutor. Most personnel decisions are led by the Supreme 
Prosecutor.” TOSHIO OGAWA, SHIKIKEN HATSUDŌ [EXERCISE OF THE DIRECTIVE 
POWER] 91 (2013) (Japan).  
 15. According to Ministry of Health, Welfare and Labor Statistics, as 
of 2009 the average life expectancies for Japanese men and women were 79.59 
and 86.44, respectively. Life Expectancy, MINISTRY OF HEALTH, WELFARE, AND 
LABOR STATISTICS, http://www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/saikin/hw/life/life09/01.html 
(last visited Feb. 28, 2014). 
 16. The career path of national public servants is common knowledge 
in Japan and it is described in whole or in part in numerous sources in both 
English and Japanese. See, e.g., WATARU OMORI, KANRYŌ SHISUTEMU [The 
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servants, but it is common to distinguish between “career” and 
“non-career” tracks. This usage of “career” and “non-career” 
(“karia” and “nonkyaria” in Japanese) is confusing to English 
speakers because both refer to what we would consider “career 
bureaucrats” as distinct from political appointees. The difference 
in the Japanese context is that “career” bureaucrats are the elite: 
graduates of Tokyo University or other top schools who have 
passed the most difficult level of the national public service 
exam. They would be destined to become the elite within the 
ministry they would join and could be expected to advance to a 
certain level of managerial role within it. Non-career refers 
essentially to “everyone else,” the much greater number of 
officials who handle the day-to-day affairs of the ministry and 
whose prospects of advancement to the top are limited by their 
non-elite status.  
Bureaucrats joining a ministry rotate through a number of 
assignments, being advanced in rank and pay in lockstep with 
the other people who entered the ministry at the same time. For 
the elite “career” officials, these assignments may include being 
seconded to other ministries and time spent studying abroad. 
After a certain point however, the lockstep advancement ceases, 
and bureaucrats from the same entering class have to start 
competing for the limited number of posts at the top of the 
pyramid.17 At the top of the pyramid is the vice minister, the top 
career bureaucrat in each ministry.18  
  
Bureaucrat System] 6-8, 101-109, 209-260 (2006) (Japan) (referencing peers of 
vice minister retiring at 102); see also KAZUMASA OKUBO, THE NATURE AND 
ROLE OF THE CIVIL SERVICE IN JAPANESE GOVERNMENT DECISION-MAKING, PRI 
Discussion Paper Series (No.05A 㸫 11), (July 2005), available at 
http://www.mof.go.jp/pri/research/discussion_paper/ron119.pdf; SHIGEAKI 
KOGA, KANRYŌ WO KOKUMIN NO TAME NI HATARAKASERU HŌ [HOW TO MAKE 
BUREAUCRATS WORK FOR THE PEOPLE] 56-92 (2011); VAN WOLFEREN, supra 
note 1, at 87, 109-158, WOODALL, supra note 1, at 51-80; see generally AKIRA 
NAKAMURA, JAPAN’S CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEM NEEDS REFORM: HUMAN 
RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT IN TRANSITION, available at http://unpan1.un.org/ 
intradoc/groups/public/documents/eropa/unpan014260.pdf 
 17. In one of his books on the Japanese bureaucracies Shigeaki Koga, a 
former high level METI official, notes the rigid lockstep nature of promotions 
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As the upper tiers of the ministry hierarchy narrow, it 
becomes impossible to continue advancing everyone in lockstep. 
Furthermore, there has been an unspoken rule that members of 
the same class are nominally equal within the hierarchy, making 
it difficult for one to be in a position of telling another what to 
do. Public service jobs are heavily protected and it is virtually 
impossible to fire a bureaucrat before statutory retirement age. 
The easiest way to get rid of them may be to offer a job with the 
same benefits and a higher retirement age, either in the private 
sector or in a quasi-governmental entity the very existence of 
which may be due in part to the need to find jobs for retiring 
bureaucrats.19  
  
but then goes on to state: “on the other hand there is fierce competition. This is 
because no matter how far one advances through senior system, there are not 
very many posts above the section chief [kachō] level. Ultimately, only one 
person from an entering class may become vice minister. So everyone aims at 
becoming a bureau chief and vice minister, while at the same time keeping an 
eye out for a good amakudari post in the event they fail. . . . In addition, certain 
posts are important for becoming vice minister. At the Ministry of Finance it is 
the head of the Budget Bureau, at METI it is the head of the Economic and 
Trade Policy Bureau. Even though they may be the same age and salary may 
not vary much depending upon post, whether you become vice minister or not 
has a big impact on how you get treated in your subsequent amakudari life. So 
everyone fights vigorously for the posts that are on the route to becoming vice 
minister.” KOGA, supra note 16, at 76.  
 18. The Ministry of Justice arguably being an exception. 
Kokkakōmuinhō [National Public Service Act], Law No. 120 of 1947, art. 
2(3)(xiii) (Japan), translated in Japanese Law Translation, MINISTRY OF JUST., 
(Apr. 1, 2009), http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/? 
ft=1&re=01&dn=1&x=0&y=0&co=01&ky=%E5%9B%BD%E5%AE%B6%E
5%85%AC%E5%8B%99%E5%93%A1%E6%B3%95&page=5; see also 
COLIGNON & USUI supra note 2, at 7 (describing the pyramid structure and how 
it is a driving force in amakudari).  
 19. As described by Koga: “For those bureaucrats who fail at getting a 
post above that of section chief, even if they quit the protection of their status 
as a public servant effectively remains. METI bureaucrats who quit are still 
METI people, MOFA people who quit are still MOFA people. Wherever they 
end up through amakudari, they receive the same salary as a top official, at 
worst the same as a department head or bureau chief. Amakudari is a system 
that was borne from the seniority-based system in which people are advanced 
based on how long they have served.” KOGA, supra note 16, at 77. 
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While most discussions of amakudari focus on elite 
bureaucrats, it should also be considered as a managerial 
problem for those same bureaucrats. Within the context of the 
so-called “lifetime” employment system, the fact that for most 
public officials it ended at the age of 60 (subject more recently to 
the possibility of re-employment on inferior terms until the age 
of 65) would be a personnel management issue for ministry 
leadership. There would thus be institutional incentives to 
procure post-retirement jobs not just for those approaching the 
top of the pyramid but “non-career” personnel as well. In fact, 
the statutory retirement age was less likely to be an issue for elite 
bureaucrats since many of them would have left government 
service before reaching that age.20  
To the extent that amakudari involves the creation of a galaxy 
of “public interest” corporations and other quasi-public or 
ostensibly private institutions of questionable necessity, it is a 
feature of Japanese governance that has been estimated by one 
observer to have both cost Japanese taxpayers ¥12 trillion and 
starved the market for legitimate non-profit organizations of 
funding and other resources.21  
While there are numerous theories seeking to justify 
amakudari as a form of deferred compensation, a mechanism for 
establishing informal relations between regulators and the 
regulated or in other terms, and some have characterized 
amakudari as an unavoidable consequence of Japan’s lifetime 
employment system, the point of this article is not to justify 
  
 20. Colignon & Usui note that “the usual retirement age for the vice 
minister is slightly over fifty,” which seems low but if true would mean that all 
others in his entering class would have to retire at roughly the same age or 
earlier. COLIGNON & USUI, supra note 2, at 7. As noted by Eisuke Sakakibara 
the ex-MOF bureaucrat once known as “Mr. Yeng “While career [MOF 
bureaucrats] rarely stay until retirement age, “non-career” bureaucrats often 
keep working until that time.” EISUKE SAKAKIBARA, ZAIMUSHO [THE MINISTRY 
OF FINANCE] 78 (2012).  
 21. See generally ICHIRŌ ICHIIMURA, AMAKUDARI NO SHINJITSU [THE 
TRUTH ABOUT AMAKUDARI], 60-80, 95-97 (2010) (discussing Amakudari). 
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amakudari but to illustrate the effect it may have on the Japanese 
legal system.22   
Rather than discussing amakudari further in general terms, 
however, it may be helpful to proceed with specific examples of 
how amakudari works. These examples will also hopefully 
illustrate the legal dimensions of the amakudari process.  
III. EXAMPLES OF AMAKUDARI IN PRACTICE 
A. Private Sector Amakudari and Corporate Governance 
We begin with the Bank of Yokohama Co., Ltd. (“BOY”). 
BOY is one of the largest and most prestigious of the second tier 
“regional” commercial banks (chihōginkō ginkō).23 Founded in 
1920, as of the end of the fiscal year ending March 31, 2013 it 
had 4,593 employees in 610 branches and offices, including a 
small overseas presence.24 As of the same date its consolidated 
assets and deposits totaled 13,468.7 billion yen and 11,450.2 
billion Yen, respectively. BOY is a publicly-traded company; its 
shares are listed on the First Section of the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange (the “TSE”), which has the most stringent listing 
standards of any exchange in Japan. As of March 31, 2013, 
BOY’s ten largest shareholders consisted of Japanese insurance 
companies, a US pension fund and several trust accounts.25 
As of the year ended March 31, 2012, the most recent filing 
available at the time this article was written, BOY had a board 
consisting of eleven directors and five statutory auditors. As is 
  
 22. See COLIGNON & USUI, supra note 2, at 57-81 (discussing various 
theories of amakudari). Former MOF official Eisuke Sakakibara is one of those 
who describes amakudari as an unavoidable byproduct of Japan’s system of 
lifetime employment and seniority-based advancement in both the public and 
private sectors. SAKAKIBARA, supra note 20 at 145.  
 23. Bank of Yokohama, BANKS AROUND THE WORLD, http://www.rel 
banks.com/asia/japan/bank-of-yokohama (last visited Mar. 4, 2014). 
 24. Corporate Data, BANK OF YOKOHAMA, (Sept. 30, 2013), 
http://www.boy.co.jp/e/company/data.html.  
 25. Stock Data, BANK OF YOKOHAMA, (Sept. 30, 2013), 
http://www.boy.co.jp/e/stock/data.htm. 
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often the case with Japanese public companies, most of the 
directors were “insiders” who spent their whole careers at the 
bank. One director, however, had spent 25 years in the Ministry 
of International Trade and Industry (now the Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry or “METI”) before descending 
into the private sector. An additional board member was a 
former Bank of Japan official and another a former judge.26 
Most significantly, however, both the president and the 
chairman of the BOY board were ex-top officials from the 
Ministry of Finance (MOF). President Tatsumaro Terazawa 
joined the MOF in 1971 and ended his career as the head of the 
National Tax Agency, a MOF subsidiary institution from which 
he retired in 2004. He then served several years at the Urban 
Renewal Agency, a special administrative corporation formed by 
the government, before being appointed as special ambassador to 
Columbia. In 2011, he joined the BOY, immediately assuming 
the presidency. It may seem odd that someone with apparently 
no experience in commercial banking – indeed, no business 
experience whatsoever - could immediately become the leader of 
a major commercial bank. Yet such transitions are not unusual in 
the world of amakudari.  
Terazawa’s transition into the world of bank management was 
likely eased by the presence of BOY’s chairman, Tadashi 
Ogawa, who had served as BOY president from 2005 until 
Terazawa took over.27 Ogawa started his career at the MOF in 
1962, retiring in 1996 after becoming vice minister – the most 
powerful bureaucrat at the nation’s most powerful ministry. 
From that position he immediately assumed the chairmanship of 
Japan Tobacco, one of the largest tobacco companies in the 
world, which until 2012 was majority-owned by the Japanese 
government.28  
  
 26. Board of Directors, BANK OF YOKOHAMA, (June 19, 2013), 
http://www.boy.co.jp/e/company/board.html. 
 27. As of June 2013 Ogawa was no longer a board member.  
 28. The government continues to be the largest shareholder, though the 
register of shareholders lists the Minister of Finance, rather than the Japanese 
state as the shareholder of its stake. See sources cited, supra notes 25-26. 
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The composition described above is not the result of mere 
happenstance. As indicated by Professor Masashi Nakano, the 
presidency of the BOY has, “as always,” been held by an ex-
MOF vice minister.29 Back in the days when the MOF was also 
the nation’s financial regulator, MOF officials retiring into the 
boards of commercial banks was quite common; in 1993 it was 
reported that 26% of the presidents of Japan’s private banks 
came from either the MOF or the Bank of Japan.30 With the 
financial regulatory function having been taken away from 
MOF, blatant instances of amakudari to board level positions 
such as BOY may now be the exception rather than the rule. Or 
perhaps the amakudari may simply have been driven down to a 
more discrete level – to “advisory” positions that do not have to 
be disclosed in regulatory filings, instead of board positions that 
do.31 Such a trend is suggested by a recent article in a weekly 
magazine, describing the troubles of Daiwa Securities which had 
three high level ex-MOF officials in advisory roles at an 
estimated cost of ¥200 million per year - expenditures some 
Daiwa employees found demoralizing since the company was 
also engaged in cost-cutting and layoffs at the same time!32  
  
 29. NAKANO, supra note 3, at 98.  
 30. Chalmers Johnson, The Foundations of Japan’s Wealth and Power, 
in JAPAN: WHO GOVERNS? 96, 108 (1996) (quoting an Oct. 1993 Nihonkeizai 
shinbun article). 
 31. Although Nakano notes the decline in amakudari by former MOF 
officials into regional banks since MOF lost the bank regulatory function, the 
list of public and private institutions having amakudari from the MOF 
contained in Ichimura’s book lists over two dozen shin’yō kinko, a type of 
small regional depository institution referred to in English as either a “shinkin 
bank” or “credit union.” NAKANO, supra note 3, at 98; see also ICHIIMURA, 
supra note 21, at 143-61. The preponderance of such institutions as MOF 
amakudari posts is interesting since, unlike regional banks and other types of 
financial institutions, no shinkin banks are public companies.  
 32. Omowanu keisan gai Daiwa Shōken ga atama wo kakaeru 
zaimushōo “amakudari” sannnin shū [Daiwa Miscalculation leaves it 
struggling with a crowd of three MOF “amakudari”], SHŪKAN GENDAI, May 
25, 2013, at 79 (Japan). Since amakudari arrangements require the 
compensation and benefits to be comparable to that of a high-level bureaucrat, 
in addition to salary, Daiwa was reportedly required to provide these three 
gentlemen with private offices, a secretary and chauffeured black limousines – 
 
2014] Amakudari and Japanese Law 891 
While much ink has been spilt regarding the subject of 
corporate governance in Japan, little consideration seems to have 
been given to what it means in the context of a company that has 
a former senior regulator on the payroll, whether as a board 
member or even an advisor. Yet it would seem impossible to 
have a meaningful discussion about the subject in normal 
corporate governance terms. Take an archetypical example used 
in corporate governance discourse – the takeover bid.  
A public tender offer directed at a public company with the 
stated intent of replacing its management in order to enhance 
shareholder returns is a classic example of an instance in which 
the conflicting duties and interests of board members become an 
issue. Yet if the target company is BOY and succeeding in the 
bid would actually result in the most important central 
government ministry losing a lucrative post-retirement sinecure, 
it might actually be very bad for the company and its 
shareholders. This would probably be obvious to anyone in 
corporate Japan, yet, at the same time, seems difficult to 
incorporate into any law-based theory of corporate governance, 
possibly because just like outright corruption, the informal 
reservation of corporate leadership roles for ex-ministry officials 
may not be anticipated by such theories. Corporate governance 
may be about many things, but providing benefits to ex-
bureaucrats outside of any legal framework is probably not 
supposed to be one of them.33 
  
benefits they would have enjoyed at taxpayer expense in their former 
government roles. Despite such high compensation, a Daiwa insider quoted in 
the article declared that the three consultants did “absolutely nothing.” The 
article speculated that they were hired as consultants on the expectation that 
one of them would be named Governor of the Bank of Japan, which 
unfortunately for Daiwa did not happen. Id. 
 33. For purposes of this article, however, it should simply be noted that 
the presence of former METI and other energy bureaucrats as advisors and 
board members in TEPCO and other companies has been noted in numerous 
press accounts. See, e.g., Keisanshō kara no amakudari denryoku 12sha he 
68nin [Amakudari 68 former METI personnel into 12 electric power 
companies], ASAHI SHINBUN, (May 3, 2011), at 9 (Japan); Tōden komon wa 
21nin, hōshūsogaku wa 2.2 okuen [21 advisors at TEPCO with total 
compensation of ¥210 million], ASAHI SHINBUN, May 22, 2011, at 5 (Japan); 
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B. Home-grown Amakudari – Foundations and Other 
Special Entities 
Amakudari is a constant source of popular criticism and the 
nation’s political leaders have developed a byzantine system of 
laws and regulations to eliminate or at least regulate the practice. 
For example, the National Public Service Act (“NPSA”) imposes 
numerous prohibitions on government institutions pressuring 
companies into accepting retirees.34 The NPSA also makes it a 
crime for ex-public servants to use their influence with their 
former employer in various ways during the two year period 
immediately following their separation from public service.35  
Yet the bureaucracies always seem to be able to find ways 
around such restrictions.36 Furthermore, insofar as 60 (or even 
65) is a comparatively young retirement age, one might 
reasonably expect that finding a steady source of post-retirement 
jobs for retiring personnel would become just one of the 
managerial tasks that have become the burden of leaders of 
bureaucracies in Japan. As noted by one former bureaucrat, in 
this respect Ministries are no different from any other large 
  
Natsuko Fukue, METI hit for “amakudari” habits that put advisors at TEPCO, 
THE JAPAN TIMES Apr. 19, 2011, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2011/04/ 
19/business/meti-hit-for-amakudari-habits-that-put-retirees-in-
tepco/#.UkqtZRC9Xg4. 
 34. See Kokkakōmuinhō [National Public Service Act], Law No. 120 
of 1947, arts. 106-07 (Japan), translated in Japanese Law Translation, 
MINISTRY OF JUST. (Apr. 1, 2009), http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/ 
law/detail/?id=2141&vm=04&re=02. 
 35. See id. art. 110 (xiv-xviii). 
 36. KOGA, supra note 16, at 123-28. Koga describes how a government 
originally intended to expand the horizons of junior public servants by 
temporarily seconding them to companies, came to be used as a means for 
“seconding” elder bureaucrats to companies or other institutions just a few 
years before they reached retirement age. That way they could simply end their 
public service already installed at their post retirement job. The laws and 
regulations were carefully drafted (by bureaucrats) to ensure that this sort of 
result did not constitute legally prohibited amakudari. Id.  
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Japanese institution, most companies having a similar low 
mandatory retirement age.37 
The difference between Japanese bureaucrats and corporate 
leaders, however, is that bureaucrats are in a position to create 
new post-retirement jobs out of whole cloth through their 
effective control of the legislative process. Although the 
Japanese constitution vests in the Diet (the nation’s parliament) 
the “sole law-making authority,” in reality the vast majority of 
legislation passed by the Diet is actually initiated by the Cabinet 
and thus drafted primarily by the relevant government 
agencies. 38  The Cabinet has the assistance of the Cabinet 
Legislation Bureau, arguably one of the most important of the 
national bureaucratic institutions in the central government, and 
one in which all of the top ministries are represented through 
employees on secondment. With much of the nation’s legislative 
business being conducted by bureaucrats, Diet members are left 
performing a role described by one ex-bureaucrat as “something 
similar to lobbyists in the US System.”39 
It is easy to identify which ministry is responsible for which 
laws, since each has a link on its website identifying the laws 
and regulations under its jurisdiction (shokan hōrei). Some go so 
  
 37. SAKAKIBARA, supra note 20, at 144. 
 38. See Recently Submitted Proposed Legislation, CABINET 
LEGISLATION BUREAU, http://www.clb.go.jp/contents/all.html (last visited Mar. 
4, 2014) (Japan) (according to Japan’s Cabinet Legislation Bureau (“CLB”), 
during the 183rd (Ordinary) Diet Session which ran from January 28 to June 26, 
2013, the Cabinet submitted to the Diet 75 bills, 63 of which became law. By 
contrast, of 81 bills submitted by Diet members, only 10 were passed into law). 
At the risk of oversimplifying, legislation submitted by the Cabinet can 
generally be assume more likely to be of bureaucratic origin and having been 
vetted by the CLB - one of the most powerful executive branch institutions – 
will likely have taken into account the interests of the various bureaucratic 
interests represented in the CLB and potentially affected by the legislation; see 
generally Richard Samuels, Politics, Security Policy, and Japan’s Cabinet 
Legislation Bureau: Who Elected These Guys, Anyway? JAPAN POLICY 
RESEARCH INSTITUTE, WORKING PAPER NO. 99 (March 2004), available at 
http://www.jpri.org/publications/workingpapers/wp99.html, for further 
discussion of the CLB in English.  
 39. SAKAKIBARA, supra note 20, at 78. 
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far as to list laws that have been submitted to the Diet but are 
still pending, coming awfully close to creating the appearance 
that it is actually the ministries themselves that propose the laws 
that they would administer if passed (which may actually be the 
case). 
The legislative system thus offers bureaucrats ample 
opportunities to draft laws to further ministry interests, while 
taking into account the concerns of other ministries as well. 
These interests may include a regular supply of post-retirement 
jobs for ministry personnel.  
One way of creating such a supply is for the ministry to 
simply create a special administrative corporation (dokuritsu 
gyōsei hōjin) or ostensibly private but actually quasi-public (i.e. 
directly or indirectly publicly funded) institution as part of a 
policy initiative. The institution is typically a foundation or 
“public interest” corporation and its charter provides for a higher 
retirement age than the public service; bureaucrats can retire into 
it as directors or line employees, depending upon their place in 
the ministry hierarchy.40 The purpose of the institution is shaped 
by the law which creates it and the policies it is supposed to be 
implementing. It may receive its initial funding from the 
government and receive various government subsidies, but may 
also enjoy a stable source of revenue through no-bid contracts 
with the ministry that created it, membership fees from 
stakeholders subject to ministry regulation, or through the 
exercise of a formal or de facto monopoly over the exercise of 
some function in a regulatory scheme that requires companies or 
persons to pay the foundation for the performance of this 
function. Which foundations and other entities “belong” to a 
particular ministry are also easy to identify, since just as ministry 
  
 40. WOODALL, supra note 1, at 74 (“It is not much of an exaggeration 
to the positions assumed [at such institutions] by these former high-level 
bureaucrats as sinecures. The posts – president, vice-president, member of the 
board of directors and auditor – usually entail few duties other than ceremonial 
functions and bring an annual salary well in excess of $100,000, a healthy 
sinecure indeed. And all the more so with generous retirement allowances.”). 
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websites also contain links to their shokanhōjin, the corporate 
entities over which they have jurisdiction. 
In a recent book, a former top METI official describes how 
the foundation-creating process works.41 
“For example, say there are a number of incidents involving 
food safety. Naturally, the people get angry and complain 
“How can this be allowed to happen? How can we feel safe 
about eating anything?” Then, at just the right time a 
bureaucrat from the Ministry of Health Welfare and Labor or 
perhaps the Food Safety Commission shows up and says 
“Okay we will do something to help.” 
The bureaucrats look like they are the peoples’ friends, right? 
And what they do is implement a law that creates new 
regulations, or amends existing law to make the rules more 
stringent. 
Both the media and the people approve and while they are 
saying “yes, yes, well done” the curtain goes down to 
applause. This is the “public picture” but it is at this point that 
the bureaucrats’ most important task begins. 
They will say “in the law let’s make it clear that ‘for 
implementation the government will take steps to inform and 
enlighten the public’. And an organization will be needed to 
implement the detailed regulations, so let’s make a new entity. 
An entity for each prefecture would also be good.”  
In this way, with nobody noticing, various things get attached 
to the new program. Using this law as leverage, a budget 
request is made using the assertion that “if we can’t do the 
various things mandated by law terrible things will happen.” 
In addition, industry groups are engaged with the following 
line of discussion: “The regulations are going to get more 
stringent, so it is going to be tough on you. How do you plan 
to implement them and inform people? You can’t do it with 
your existing industry association can you? So let us make you 
  
 41. KOGA, supra note 16, at 123-28.  
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a new organization. Your existing one is not good enough to 
keep the people safe.” 
Actually the existing organization provably is adequate, but a 
new one is made anyways. Of course, companies become 
members of that organization and give it money in the form of 
membership fees or cooperation fees. At the same time, the 
organization says “if we leave it to just a few companies it will 
not be impartial, so the country will send some OBs [“old 
boys” = retired bureaucrats].” The Director is a former career 
bureaucrat, and the general manager is a former non-career 
bureaucrat. 
With this a new amakudari program is complete!”42 
 
This is a cynical characterization written for a general 
audience in a mass-market non-fiction book. It is nonetheless 
probably not an inaccurate description of how some forms of 
amakudari work – in fact once one becomes sensitive to this 
dynamic, virtually every foundation or association purporting to 
serve a public service becomes suspect as a possible amakudari 
vehicle.  
C. Jigyō Shiwake - A Window Into the World of 
Amakudari Foundations 
One of the remarkable accomplishments of the short-lived 
Democratic Party of Japan administration was its 2010 jigyō 
shiwake (literally “sorting out operations”) campaign. Jigyō 
shiwake was an effort to shine a spotlight on the incestuous 
collusion between government institutions and foundations of 
various types that both served as mediums for amakudari but 
also enjoyed a privileged status within various regulatory 
regimes. Jigyō shiwake was dismissed as political theater by 
some; despite publicizing seemingly ridiculous examples of 
government waste, collusion and amakudari, recommendations 
  
 42. Id. at 83-84.  
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that they be eliminated made by the panels of politicians, 
academics and others who conducted the reviews were non-
binding, and many of the foundations identified as problematic 
remain in existence.43  
Nonetheless, the reports resulting from the process make 
some of the most illuminating, not to mention entertaining 
reading on the grubby realities of the process of government-
manufactured amakudari.44 Space allows only a few examples: 
was it necessary in this day and age for the Salt Industry Center 
of Japan - a foundation - to be acting as an emergency supply of 
a basic and widely available commodity like salt? More to the 
point, was it necessary for such a foundation to have 
accumulated net assets worth over ¥60 billion, including ¥43 
billion in marketable securities?45 Similarly, allowing the Airport 
Environment Improvement Foundation to lease public land at 
  
 43. See, e.g., Jigyo shiwake, gekijogata yame, jimichi ni tenken wo 
[Jigyo Shiwake: instead of theatrics, a sober evaluation], GIFU SHINBUN (Nov. 
26, 2012), http://www.gifu-np.co.jp/column/syasetsu/sya20121126.shtml 
(Japan) (noting criticism of the process as “just a show” and having no basis in 
law). 
 44. See Business Sorting, GOV’T REVITALIZATION UNIT (Apr.-May 
2010), http://www.cao.go.jp/sasshin/shiwake.html (Japan), for more 
information on the official records of the jigyo shiwake [business sorting] 
process.  
 45. GOV’T REVITALIZATION UNIT, JIGYOSHIWAKE SALT CENTER 
FOUNDATION SECTION MEETING NOTES [hereinafter SALT CENTER NOTES] 2, 
available at http://www.cao.go.jp/sasshin/shiwake/detail/gijiroku/a-26.pdf 
(Japan); see generally GOV’T REVITALIZATION UNIT, SALT CENTER 
EVALUATION REPORT [hereinafter SALT CENTER EVALUATION REPORT], 
available at http:/www.cao.go.jp/sasshin/data/shiwake/result/A-26.pdf 
(describing Salt Center meeting). According to the Salt Center Notes, this 
foundation had a single full-time director who was a former bureaucrat. SALT 
CENTER NOTES, at 5. Note that the Salt Center Foundation traces its roots back 
to when salt and tobacco were both government-controlled monopolies. A 
significant portion of the foundation’s assets were transferred together with the 
salt business from Japan Tobacco in 1996, and the Evaluation Report 
recommended that such assets be returned to the national treasury. SALT 
CENTER EVALUATION REPORT, at 2. This illustrates one other aspect of the 
amakudari system; that it may result in significant amounts of ostensibly public 
funds becoming lodged in quasi-private entities that nonetheless remain under 
the control of insiders from a particular Ministry. 
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low rents to use as airport parking lots and then use the profits 
garnered for investments in whatever environmental 
improvements its board felt appropriate with no public 
supervision whatsoever was similarly “difficult to understand.”46 
Of the foundation’s twelve directors, five were ministry “old 
boys” (OBs), including three of the five full-time directors.47 Just 
over half of its 234 full and part-time employees were also ex-
bureaucrats, illustrating that amakudari is not just a matter of 
jobs for former- ministry high-fliers.  
More examples: some evaluators questioned whether the 
Snow Research Center could perform its stated mandate of 
“considering how to manage winter road surfaces and how to test 
and evaluate snow-clearing equipment” from its headquarters in 
  
 46. See generally GOV’T REVITALIZATION UNIT, JIGYO SHIWAKE 
AIRPORT ENV’T IMPROVEMENT FOUNDATION SECTION NOTES AND EVALUATION 
REPORT (Japan), available at http://www.cao.go.jp/sasshin/shiwake/detail/ 
2010-05-20.html (illustrating what may be another feature of this sort of 
Amakudari vehicle). The Report indicates that a particular group of current or 
ex-bureaucrats could use public resources to engage in activities they consider 
to in the public interest, but without public oversight or accountability. Another 
example of this dynamic was brought to light by a 2010 newspaper report about 
ex-supreme court justice Yasukazu Kagawa who at the age of 88, was able to 
receive a ¥15 million loan with no repayment terms and a sudden doubling of 
the salary he was receiving from the now-defunct Minji Johō Center, a now-
defunct foundation affiliated with the Ministry of Justice. See Ex-justice taps 
body for easy loan, raise, THE JAPAN TIMES (Apr. 14, 2010), http://www.japan 
times.co.jp/news/2010/04/14/national/ex-justice-taps-body-for-easy-loan-
raise/#.Ui_Q6z-9Xg4. Kagawa reportedly had no intention of repaying the loan 
since he was using it to fund an essay contest, and no board action was taken on 
either the loan or the salary increase until several months after they were made. 
Although the Ministry of Justice and judiciary are both key actors in the 
development of corporate governance, actual corporate governance is 
apparently something that only happens to commercial businesses. 
 47. It seems to be a common feature of foundations and other entities 
that serve as amakudari vehicles that they have various large boards, the 
majority of whom are academics or non-government OBs. Closer investigation 
reveals that only a few board members are “full-time” (jōkin) directors of the 
type that would receive a regular salary from the organization. While ministry 
OBs are usually a small minority when compared to the total board, they 
account for a significant number of the full time directors (sometimes being the 
only full-time director).  
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the fashionable (and generally snow-free) Nihonbashi district at 
the center of Tokyo.48 The location may have been convenient 
for the five out of fourteen directors (including the sole full-time 
director) and four out of fourteen employees who were Ministry 
OB.49 
Although the jigyō shiwake process took place the year 
before the March 11, 2011 nuclear disaster at Fukushima, in 
hindsight it may rankle to learn that the Japan Industrial Location 
Center50 (OB: five of twenty directors (including two of four 
full-time directors), two of 44 employees) and the Japan Atomic 
Energy Relations Organization (OB: two of thirty-six (!) 
directors, zero of thirty four employees) were placing 
advertisements in cooking magazines to foster support for 
nuclear power amongst Japanese homemakers.51  
  
 48. See GOV’T REVITALIZATION UNIT, SNOW RESEARCH CENTER 
EVALUATION REPORT 3, available at http://www.cao.go.jp/sasshin/shiwake/ 
detail/2010-05-21.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2014) The Snow Research Center 
has a website. SNOW RES. CENTER, http://www.yukicenter.or.jp/ (last visited 
Feb. 11, 2014). 
 49. As many directors as employees!  
 50. English Page, JAPANESE INDUS. LOCATION CENTER, 
http://www.jilc.or.jp/en/index.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2014). 
 51. JAPAN ATOMIC ENERGY REL. ORG., http://www.jaero.or.jp/ (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2014); see generally GOV’T REVITALIZATION UNIT, 
EVALUATION REPORT ON JIGYO SHIWAKE [hereinafter EVALUATION REPORT ON 
JIGYO SHIWAKE], available at http://www.cao.go.jp/sasshin/shiwake/detail/ 
2010-05-20.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2014) (on file with author) (describing 
the Japanese nuclear energy sector’s marketing efforts). This sort of activity is 
just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to spending on pro-nuclear marketing. 
13.8 billion yen was reportedly spent on government funded pro-nuclear 
advertising and pointless “research,” much of it filtered through amakudari 
institutions which had no-bid contracts with the government but ended up 
outsourcing the substantive task at market rates to outside vendors, meaning the 
government ended up massively overpaying for commercial services with the 
bulk going to meeting the institution’s payroll. “Genpatsu wa anzen” ni 138 
oku, keisanshō amakudari dantai he no genpatsu hojokin risutō [13.8 billion 
for “Nuclear Power is Safe” – a list of subsidies to METI amakudari 
organizations], JAERO, (Aug. 8, 2011), http://www.jaero.or.jp/ (Japan). 
Depressingly, in the two years after the Fukushima meltdown, the government 
spent almost ¥2.5 billion marketing nuclear power, with approximately 70% of 
this amount going to institutions with government OB and TEPCO alumni on 
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People who have studied Japanese at a language school in 
Japan may be surprised to know that the foundation that 
accredits such institutions, the Association for Promotion of 
Japanese Language Education (APJLE),52  has been under the 
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) rather than 
educational authorities. This relationship is illustrated by the fact 
that three of the APJLE’s directors were ex-immigration bureau 
officials (the immigration system being under the jurisdiction of 
the MOJ).53 This may explain why the foundation’s accrediting 
requirements for Japanese language schools seem devoted as 
much to ensuring compliance with student visa requirements as 
with teaching Japanese properly.54 It might also explain the odd 
  
their boards. Kuni no genpatsu kōhō jiko go 25 okuen, amakudari denryokukei 
ga 66% juchū [After accident, government spends ¥2.5 billion on nuclear 
marketing, 66% goes to amakudari and electric company-affiliates, ASAHI 
SHINBUN (June 17, 2013), at 1 (Japan), http://www.jaero.or.jp/; 
http://www.jilc.or.jp/; see generally Jigyō Shiwake, GOV’T REVITALIZATION 
UNIT, http://www.cao.go.jp/sasshin/shiwake/detail/2010-05-20.html (last 
visited Mar. 31, 2014), for jigyō shiwake notes and reports (on file with author).  
 52. ASS’N FOR PROMOTION JAPANESE LANGUAGE EDUC., 
http://www.nisshinkyo.org/english/index.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2014). 
 53. The Association has apparently recently stopped giving full details 
regarding its directors on its website, listing only its “principal directors” 
[omōna yakuin]. ASS’N FOR PROMOTION JAPANESE LANGUAGE EDUC., 
http://www.nisshinkyo.org/review/index.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2014). The 
author’s assertion that there were ex-immigration officials is based on memory 
from looking at directors’ lists when there was full disclosure about the 
directors and their backgrounds on the website. The Jigyō Shiwake Report (2nd 
Round) notes that the foundation only has four full time employees, three of 
whom are government OB. GOV’T REVITALIZATION UNIT, ASSOCIATION FOR 
THE PROMOTION OF JAPANESE LANGUAGE EDUCATION EVALUATION REPORT (2ND 
ROUND) 106-07, [hereinafter APJLE REPORT], available at 
http://www.cao.go.jp/sasshin/shiwake.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2014) (Japan) 
(on file with author). 
 54. See The Criteria for the Operation of Japanese Educational 
Institutions, ASS’N FOR PROMOTION JAPANESE LANGUAGE EDUC., available at 
http://www.nisshinkyo.org/review/index.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2014). The 
assertion that they are focused on immigration compliance rather than 
educational content is a subjective one made by the author. In 2012 for reasons 
unrelated to this research the author had the opportunity to talk with the 
operators of several Japanese language schools, all of whom confirmed that 
even though accreditation was not a formal requirement being accredited by the 
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yet reasonable suggestion made by one jigyō shiwake evaluator 
that “some sort of system should be developed for evaluating the 
quality of Japanese language education” (as opposed to 
evaluating schools, apparently).55  
In connection with the legal system, it is noteworthy that one 
of the more egregious examples of an amakudari mechanism 
brought to light through the Jigyō shiwake process involved the 
MOJ and its captive public-interest foundation, the Japan 
Correctional Association (JCA).56 With government OB as 11 of 
its 24 directors (including both full time directors) and 19 of its 
53 employees, the JCA supplies materials to prison 
manufacturing operations and provides the sundries purchased 
by the nation’s prison population, a nicely captive market. As 
noted by the Jigyo shiwake evaluation report, its chairmanship 
had become the designated retirement spot for the Supreme 
Prosecutor (kenji sōchō), the nation’s top prosecutor and also top 
career official at the MOJ (which regulates the entire correctional 
system).57 Not only that, but a portion of its expenses - including 
the ¥6 million a year salary paid to the chairman (a part-time 
  
Association greatly facilitated the issuance of student visas to persons seeking 
to come to Japan to study Japanese. If this were the case, it would suggest 
another feature of amakudari systems as they pertain to the legal system is that 
they can result in the creation of regulatory requirements that are not actually 
founded in law. As concluded by the Report, “The legal justification is that the 
results of an evaluation conducted by a private sector organization with only 
four full-time employees, three of whom are government OB, is ‘used for 
reference’ (sankō ni suru), it is unclear whether it is necessary to go through 
this Association and the appropriateness of the evaluation fees and renewal fees 
being charged is also problematic. We conclude that the system should be made 
legally clear, and that these operations [evaluation of Japanese language 
schools by the Association] should be terminated.” APJLE REPORT, supra note 
53. 
 55. Id.  
 56. JAPANESE CORRECTIONAL ASS’N, http://www.kyousei-k.gr.jp/ (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2014). 
 57. GOV’T REVITALIZATION UNIT, JAPANESE CORRECTIONAL ASS’N 
EVALUATION REPORT 2-3, [hereinafter JCA REPORT] http://www.cao.go.jp/ 
sasshin/shiwake/detail/2010-05-25.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2014) (on file 
with author). 
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role) – were met through supposedly voluntary contributions 
from prison guards.58  
IV. HOW AMAKUDARI FOUNDATIONS MAY SHAPE THE LAW 
While the records of the jigyō shiwake process provide 
numerous opportunities for voyeuristic insights into amakudari 
and other forms of institutional nepotism in Japan, let us step 
back to focus on some more specific examples of how amakudari 
can affect the structure and functioning of the legal system itself. 
As hinted at in the example of the APLJE in the preceding 
section, a common approach is to include in a law some 
licensing, accrediting or other similar requirement. The official 
confirmation that this requirement has been satisfied is then 
delegated to a body or institution designated by the regulator. 
The accrediting or other requirement may seem neutral or 
reasonable on its face and may even be substantively legitimate; 
the point is that the applicable regulator essentially grants to an 
ostensibly private body a virtual monopoly on performing that 
function, or if not a monopoly, a significant competitive 
advantage in doing so.  
Examples that came up during the jigyō shiwake process 
included the requirement that licensed pilots have periodic 
medical exams. This is a perfectly legitimate regulatory 
requirement, of course, but the evaluators questioned why they 
had to be performed by “designated” professionals and 
organizations, including the government-affiliated Japan 
Aeromedical Research Center ((JARC), which five of 13 
  
 58. As queried by one of the members of the working group committee 
meeting held on May 25, 2013, “So you are taking membership fees from 
prison guards who are on the job and who probably aren’t highly paid. Since 
98% of them participated, they are essentially being forced to pay these fees, 
some of which go to paying ¥6 million a year to an ex-supreme prosecutor who 
of course is qualified as a lawyer and can easily earn a living practicing law; 
do you think these people can accept paying such a person six million yen?” 
JCA REPORT, supra note 57. Possibly because of the bad publicity resulting 
from this process, at the time of writing the chairman of the JCA was a 
respected professor of criminal law rather than an ex-prosecutor. 
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directors and one of 27 employees being government OB).59 A 
similar legal requirement that janitors receive yearly training of 
the sort offered by the National Cleaning Service Guidance 
Center (three of 21 directors and four of ten employees were 
government OB) was deemed incomprehensible.60  
These examples may seem minor or even amusing, but others 
(some of which notably were not covered in the jigyo shiwake 
process) can involve serious money. Take the supposedly quaint 
Japanese pastime known as pachinko. Nothing more than a form 
of legalized gambling in a country where gambling is nominally 
illegal, Pachinko generates approximately ¥20 trillion in sales 
annually.61  
Although pachinko has traditionally been a mechanical game 
involving balls and a pin table, many pachinko parlors now 
feature casino-like slot machines. Under the Act for the Control 
and Improvement of Amusement Businesses, all pachinko 
machines must meet standards established by the National Public 
Safety Commission, including criteria intended to prevent the 
  
 59. GOV’T REVITALIZATION UNIT, http://www.cao.go.jp/sasshin/ 
shiwake/detail/2010-05-20.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2014) (on file with 
author); JAPANESE AERONAUTICAL RES. CENTER, http://www.aeromedical.or.jp/ 
(last visited Feb. 10, 2014). The requirement for pilots to have medical checks 
from qualifying doctors is from Article 31 of the Civil Aeronautics Act. 
Kōkūhō [Civil Aeronautics Act], Law No. 231 of 1952, art. 31 (Japan), English 
translation available at http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/? 
re=02&dn=1&x=32&y=10&co=1&ha=02&ia=03&yo=&gn=&sy=&ht=&no=
&bu=&ta=&ky=the+civil+aeronautics+act&page=5. 
 60. APJLE REPORT, supra note 53, at 117-18; ZENKOKU SEIKATSU EISEI 
EIGYŌ SHIDŌ SENTĀ [NATIONAL CLEANING SERVICE GUIDANCE CENTER], 
http://www.seiei.or.jp/top/index.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2012) (Japan). The 
legal basis for the training requirement can be found at Article 8-3 of the 
Cleaning Business Law. Kurīningu jigyōhō [Cleaning Business Act], Law No. 
207 of 1950 (Japan). 
 61. According to the most recent information available on the website 
of Nichiyukyo, a pachinko industry trade association, total sales for the 
industry in 2010 and 2009 were approximately ¥21 trillion respectively. 
Massive though these numbers are, they represent a significant decline from 
peak sales of ¥29.6 million in 2003. Income, Participants, and Number of 
Activities, NICHIYUKYO, http://www.nichiyukyo.or.jp/condition/ (last visited 
Feb. 10, 2014) (Japan). 
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use of machines that excessively stimulates players’ desire to 
gamble (because it’s not gambling, you see).62 The same Act 
also delegates many of the details of this standard-setting to 
subsidiary regulations and local rules which require all types of 
Pachinko machines to pass a test conducted by a designated 
testing body.63 One such testing body is a foundation known as 
the Security Communications Association, which provides a 
variety of services but derived ¥2 billion in revenue in 2012 from 
pachinko machine testing. 64  Four of the association’s 12 
directors were former bureaucrats, including three of its four 
full-time directors who were formerly officials from national and 
prefectural police organizations.65 
  
 62. Fūzoku eigyōtō no kisei oyobi gyōmu no tekiseikatō ni kansuru 
hōritsu [Act for the Control and Improvement of Amusement Businesses], Law 
No. 122 of 1948 (Japan). 
 63. Yūgiki no nintei oyōbi keishiki no kenteitō ni kansuru kisōku 
[Rules for the Accrediting and Certification Testing of Entertainment Devices], 
National Public Safety Commission Rule 4 of 1985, art. 12 (Japan). The 
Japanese police are organized primarily on a prefectural rather than national 
basis, meaning that there are also local rules on Pachinko certification. For 
example, the Ehime Prefectural police regulations on certification require the 
relevant section of the prefectural police to certify pachinko machines, except 
that those using microprocessors (which would be all of them in this day and 
age) must be certified by a designated testing agency. Yūgiki no nintei oyōbi 
kentei ni kansuru jimu no toriatsukai yōryō [Guidelines for Processing the 
Certification and Evaluation of Entertainment Devices], Regulation No. 1 of 
Jan. 22, 1986 (Japan), available at vhttp://www.police.pref.ehime.jp/kitei/data 
/reiki/hen4/4502050.htm. While beyond the scope of this article, the possibility 
of this sort of certification requirement functioning could act as a non-tariff 
trade barrier is hopefully obvious. 
 64. Revenue and director information as available at the time of writing 
on the association’s website. SECURITY COMM. ASS’N, 
http://www.hotsukyo.or.jp/index.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2014). In his 2005 
expose of the pachinko industry, journalist Atsushi Mizoguchi describes the 
Security Communication Association as being the only certifying body in 
Japan. He also interviews the Association’s ex-chairman, an 84 year-old former 
head of the National Police Agency who explained that he only went to its 
offices once a month or so. MIZOGUCHI ATSUSHI, PACHINKō “30 CHŌEN NO 
YAMI” [PACHINKO: ¥30 TRILLION OF DARKNESS] (2005) 183-87. 
 65. What appears common in these types of foundations is that they 
often have a large number of directors of various types, most of whom are part-
time (hijōkin) and are often academics or representatives of various stakeholder 
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There is of course a chicken-and-egg aspect to the role such 
foundations play in the legal system. In some cases they may 
fulfill a necessary function that just happens to have been co-
opted to the extent necessary to benefit a few ex-officials; in 
others, the legal requirement may have been created with such 
benefits being one of the intended goals. Which came first may 
not really matter because either way the result would seem to be 
a legal structure that is both difficult to change (insofar as it 
would require the ministry responsible for amending the law to 
do so in a way which caused it to lose a program beneficial to its 
personnel) and potentially impolitic for anyone subject to the 
ministry’s jurisdiction to openly criticize. 
In some cases, Amakudari may also provide a means of inter-
agency compromise. This is illustrated by Japan’s apparent 
solution to the question that has long plagued intellectual 
property specialists – should computer programs be protected by 
patent or copyright?66 In Japan, patents and trademarks fall under 
the jurisdiction of the Patent Agency, a METI subsidiary agency, 
while copyright is the mandate of the Agency for Cultural 
Affairs (ACA), under the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, 
Science and Technology (commonly abbreviated “MEXT”). 67 
This potentially serious jurisdictional dispute appears to have 
been resolved through a combination of a provision in the 
Copyright Act making it clear that computer programs are 
“works” in which authors could enjoy rights protected under the 
act, and a special statute requiring that such copyrights be 
registered not with the ACA, as is the case with copyrights in 
other types of works, but with an institution designated by the 
  
groups. The former bureaucrats may represent a minority but tend to dominate 
the full-time (jōkin) directorships, which would mean they would be getting a 
full-time salary.  
 66. See, e.g., John Swinson, Patent or Copyright or Both: An 
Algorithmic Approach to Computer Software Protection, 5 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 
146 (1991).  
 67. Japan Pat. Off., JPO, http://www.jpo.go.jp/index.htm (last visited 
Feb. 8, 2014); AGENCY FOR CULTURAL AFF., http://www.bunka.go.jp/ 
chosakuken/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2014). 
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ACA. 68  That institution is the seemingly innocuous Software 
Information Center (SOFTIC), a foundation that provides a 
variety of software-related services (including dispute 
resolution).69 Of the 22 foundation’s 22 various types of board 
members at the time of writing (compared to only 16 employees 
of various types) three were former patent agency officials – 
including one filling one of the two full time directorships – and 
another from the Small and Medium Enterprise Agency, another 
METI affiliate.70 Nobody from the ACA was represented on the 
board, though it retained legal jurisdiction over software 
copyrights and the authority to designate the institution 
empowered to register software copyrights.71 
A detailed discussion of the substantive merits of outsourcing 
the government role of the registration of software copyrights is 
beyond the scope of this paper. While SOFTIC appears to ensure 
a generous salary for at least one former patent agency official, 
the revenues it generates directly from performing this role 
appears small – just over ¥5 million in the year ending March 31, 
2013, compared to total operating revenues of ¥608 million for 
the same period. 72  Nonetheless, the fact remains that an 
  
 68. Chosakukenhō [Copyright Act], Law No. 48 of 1970, art. 10(1)(ix) 
(Japan), English translation available at http://www.japaneselawtranslation. 
go.jp/?re=01(translating law into English); Purōguramū no chosakubutū ni 
kakawarū torokū no tokurei ni kansurū horitsū [Law on Exceptional provisions 
for the registration of program works], Law No. 65 of 1986, art. 5 (Japan), 
available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=214983. 
 69. SOFTWARE INFO. CENTER, http://www.softic.or.jp/en/index.html 
(last visited Feb. 21, 2014). 
 70. See generally Roster of Councilors, Auditors and Directors 
SOFTWARE INFO. CENTER, available at 
http://www.softic.or.jp/lib/info_pub/yakuin-meibo.pdf (describing Japanese 
copyright protections). 
 71. Public Information, SOFTWARE INFO. CENTER, 
http://www.softic.or.jp/lib/info_pub/index.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2014).  
 72. Id. According to the disclosure also available on the website, full-
time director from the patent agency was entitled to a monthly salary of 
¥950,000 per month plus discretionary bonus plus a lump-sum upon retirement 
calculated at the rate of approximately ¥118,750 for each month of service. 
Note that since such directorships are assumed by people who may only serve 
for a few years before they retire from them, cycling through several 
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ostensibly private foundation from which ex-bureaucrats derive 
benefits is now in control of a basic government function, the 
registering of copyrights. More importantly, perhaps, the 
registration function is being performed not by a (theoretically) 
neutral government actor, but by a foundation that has additional 
revenues from membership fees paid by large electronic 
companies and other IT companies, interests that doubtless have 
a particular view of the way software copyrights should be 
administered.73 
V. AMAKUDARI AND THE PRIVATE-SECTOR LEGAL 
PROFESSIONS  
A. Law schools and the Artificial “Hōsō Population 
Problem” 
The creation and operation of foundations are not the only 
way in which the legal system provides post-retirement 
opportunities for bureaucrats. Let us turn now to the legal 
services industry in Japan. This is a particularly timely subject 
since at the time of writing Japan was in the throes of its first 
decade of disastrous (so far) reforms to the way it trained some 
of its legal professionals, particularly lawyers, a problematic 
term as we shall see.  
One of the pillars of legal system reform in Japan has been an 
increase in the number of people passing the government-
administered National Bar Exam (NBE) and requiring most of 
those who sit for the exam to have obtained a J.D. degree from 
an graduate law school.74 As part of this reform an entirely new 
system of law schools began operations in 2004. At one time 
  
directorships would potentially enable an ex-bureaucrat to receive several such 
lump-sum payments.  
 73. Id. A membership list is also available on the foundation’s website. 
 74. See JUSTICE SYS. REFORM COUNCIL, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 
JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL - FOR A JUSTICE SYSTEM TO SUPPORT JAPAN 
IN THE 21ST CENTURY, ch. III, pt. 2 (2001), available at 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/judiciary/2001/0612report.html.  
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there were as many 74 law schools, all opened based on a 
cabinet-level decision to have 3,000 people passing the bar exam 
each year by 2010.75  
Almost as soon as the first crop of law students graduated in 
2006, however, a hue and cry began to arise from bar 
associations about the sudden increase in the number of lawyers 
(bar exam passers may also become judges or prosecutors, but 
the principle increase has been seen only in the number of 
lawyers).76 Such opposition has resulted in a reduction in the 
number of people allowed to pass the NBE every year, a 
disastrous result for the law schools, of which there were too 
many even at the 3,000 level. 77  Politics and unsubstantiated 
assertions about “poor quality” law school education resulted in 
the 3,000 target never being reached. The number of people who 
  
 75. Shihōseidō kaikakū suishin keikakū [Plan for advancing justice system 
reform], Cabinet Res. of Mar. 19, 2002 (Japan), available at 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sihou/keikaku/020319keikaku.html.  
 76. For example, the Aichi Prefecture Bar Association had issued a 
formal opinion calling for a reassessment of the 3,000 per year number by 
February 13, 2007, This was at a time before a single one of the 1,009 law 
school graduates who passed the NBE in 2006 had qualified to practice law (all 
of those who graduated and passed the NBE in 2006 would have still been in 
the early stage of their required training course at the Supreme Court’s Legal 
Research and Training Institute). Opinion on lawyer population, AICHI BAR 
ASS’N (Feb. 13, 2007), http://www.aiben.jp/page/frombars/topics2/272zinko 
u.html.  
 77. A detailed discussion of the law school system is beyond the scope 
of this paper. In any case, there is a wide range of literature on the subject 
available in English. See, e.g., Mayumi Saegusa, Why the Japanese Law School 
System Was Established: Co-optation as a Defensive Tactic in the Face of 
Global Pressures, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 365 (2009); Colin P.A. Jones, 
Japan’s New Law Schools: The Story So Far, 27 J. JAPANESE L. 248 (2009); 
Peter A. Joy et al., Building Clinical Legal Education Programs in a Country 
Without a Tradition of Graduate Professional Legal Education: Japan 
Educational Reform as a Case Study, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 417 (2006); George 
Schumann, Beyond Litigation: Legal Education Reform in Japan and What 
Japan’s New Lawyers Will Do, 13 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 475 
(2006); Takahiro Saito, The Tragedy of Japanese Legal Education: Japanese 
“American” Law Schools¸ 24 WIS. INT’L L. J. 197 (2006); Koichirō Fujikura, 
Reform of Legal Education in Japan: The Creation of Law Schools Without a 
Professional Sense of Mission, 75 TUL. L. R. 941 (2001). 
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passed the NBE in 2013 bar was only 2049, and bar associations 
have been calling for the number of passers to be reduced to as 
low as 1,000 or even for the law school system to be abolished 
entirely.78 According to press accounts and the vested interests 
involved, Japan was in the throes of dealing with a hōsō 
population problem – an oversupply of people who have passed 
the NBE. 
This state of affairs has led to a prolonged debate about the 
“correct” number of hōsō, the Japanese term used to refer to the 
triumvirate of bengoshi lawyers, judges and prosecutors who 
have passed the NBE. The debate is surreal for a number of 
reasons. First the notion that there is an identifiable “correct” 
number of annual bar passers that can be designated by the 
government is questionable to say the least, yet forms the very 
foundation of the debate. Second, despite such open discussions 
about what in an anti-trust context might be considered a form of 
“production restrictions,” the statutory fiction underlying the 
NBE – that it is intended to ensure that passers have the 
minimum levels of knowledge and ability to practice law 79  - 
often results in the low NBE pass rate being attributed to the 
“quality” of law school education. 80  This in turn is surreal 
  
 78. See, e.g., Legal Profession Population Problem Project Team, 
HYOGŌ-KEN BAR ASS’N, http://www.hyogoben.or.jp/about/index-03-18.html 
(last visited Feb. 16, 2014) (stating the resolution passed by the Hyogō Bar 
Association calling for number of passers to be reduced to 1,000 per year). A 
2012 Advisory Opinion issued by the Japan Federation of Bar Associations 
noted that its membership included lawyers who were calling for the complete 
abolition of the law school system. JAPAN FED’N OF BAR ASS’NS, 
HOKADAIGAKUIN SEIDŌ NO KAIZEN NI KANSURŪ GUTAITEKI TEIGEN [SPECIFIC 
PROPOSALS IN CONNECTION WITH IMPROVING THE LAW SCHOOL SYSTEM] 6 (2012), 
available at http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/activity/document/opinion/year/ 
2012.html. 
 79. Shihōshikenhō [National Bar Exam Act], Law No. 140 of 1949, art. 
1 (Japan).  
 80. Despite supposedly being intended to test whether candidates have 
the minimum level of knowledge required to be an attorney, judge or 
prosecutor, the bar exam pass rate is essentially derived from the number of 
people who the government allows to pass any given year over the number of 
people who sit for it. Even government actors openly discuss what the “correct” 
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because law school education was specifically intended to be 
about more than just passing the NBE; MEXT regulations 
actually prohibit law schools from devoting too much curricular 
time to NBE subjects!81 
For purposes of this article, however, the most surreal aspect 
of the debate over the “correct” number of hōsō is that, although 
commonly framed in terms of the needs of the Japanese people, 
it ignores a very basic reality: that a great deal of demand for 
legal services in Japan are met by members of other licensed 
legal professions that have not passed the NBE. 
  
number of passers should be, thus illustrating that the basic function of the 
exam is to impose numerical limits on entrants to the elite legal professions, 
rather than ensure that they possess an objective minimal level of skills or 
knowledge. This basic reality has not stopped vast amounts of energy being 
devoted to the subject of what is wrong with law school education, based on the 
low pass rates at many schools! The MEXT had a study group looking at how 
to “improve law school education” that had already issued recommendations 
barely after the first class of law school graduates had qualified to practice. 
CHŪŌ KYŌIKU SHINGIKAI DAIGAKU BUNKAKAI HŌKADAIGAKUIN TOKUBETSU 
IINKAI, HŌKADAIGAKUIN KYŌIKU NO SHITSU NO KŌJŌ NO TAME NO KAIZEN 
HŌSAKU NI TSUITE (HŌKOKU), [CENTRAL EDUCATION COUNCIL, UNIVERSITY 
SECTION, SPECIAL LAW SCHOOL COMMITTEE, REGARDING WAYS OF IMPROVING 
THE QUALITY OF LAW SCHOOL EDUCATION (REPORT)] (2009), available at 
http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/koutou/senmonshoku/index.htm. This body had 
its first meeting in March of 2008 and issued an interim report full of 
recommendations by September of the same year, a time at which only a single 
law school class (those graduating in 2006) would have only recently registered 
as lawyers and begun to practice of law. This indicates that the “quality” of law 
school education as it might be evaluated by actual users of legal services has 
never been a concern in the debate.  
 81. Senmonshokudaigakuin ni kanshi hitsuyō jikō ni tsuite sadamerū 
ken [Provisions for Certain Matters Necessary for Law Schools], MEXT 
Directive No. 53 art. 5, 2003 (Japan), available at http://www.mext.go.jp/ 
a_menu/koutou/houka/03050102.html. These requirements are further clarified 
by accrediting requirements. For example, the accrediting standards set by the 
National Institution for Academic Degrees and University Evaluation (NIAD-
UE), a special administrative corporation that is one of the designated 
accrediting bodies, limit law schools to devoting a maximum of 54 of the 
minimum 93 credits required for graduation to mandatory bar exam subjects. 
Past and current accreditation requirements available at the NIAD-UE website. 
NAT’L INST. FOR ACAD. DEGREES & U. EVALUATION, http://www.niad.ac.jp 
/n_hyouka/houka/1182394_1140.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2014).  
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It has long been common to compare Japan and the United 
States in terms of their lawyer population, with the US typically 
being described as having a number of lawyers one or two orders 
of magnitude greater than Japan - 22,000 against “more than a 
million”– according to a 2006 article, for example. 82  Yet 
common-law lawyers familiar with Japan are quick to point out 
that the US has a unitary profession while Japan does not, 
rendering comparisons such as the above one of “apples v. 
persimmons” (the title of one comparatively early article 
pointing out this basic feature of the Japanese legal system).83 At 
the same time, western commentators on these other professions 
tend to describe them with diminishing terms such as 
“scriveners” or “quasi-lawyers,” perhaps unconsciously 
reflecting the condescension that in the author’s experience is 
not uncommon when Japanese (usually those who have passed 
the NBE) refer to these other professions.84 
B. Into the Jungle: the Taxonomy of Japanese Legal 
Professions 
This section will give a brief description of the various 
licensed professions that the author believes accounts for the 
bulk of the legal services industry. Included are several 
professions that have not featured in previous western literature 
  
 82. Ian Rowley & Kenji Hall, Japan: Lawyers Wanted. Really, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. (Mar. 22, 2006), http://www.businessweek.com/ 
stories/2006-03-22/japan-lawyers-wanted-dot-really; see generally David 
Hood, Exclusivity and the Japanese Bar: Ethics or Self-Interest?, 6 PAC. RIM L. 
& POL’Y J. 199 (1997) (describing low NBE passage rate). 
 83. See generally Richard S. Miller, Apples v. Persimmons: The Legal 
Profession in Japan and the United States, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 27 (1989) 
(describing Japanese legal education).  
 84. See, e.g., Masanobu Kato, The Role of Law and Lawyers in Japan 
and the United States, 1987 BYU L. REV. 627 (1987); Kyoko Ishida, Ethical 
Standards of Japanese Lawyers: Translation of the Ethics Codes for Six 
Categories of Legal Service Providers, 14 PAC. RIM. L. & POL’Y J. 383 (2005); 
Lee Rousso, Japan’s New Patent Attorney Law Breaches Barrier Between the 
“Legal” and “Quasi-Legal” Professions: Integrity of Japanese Patent Practice 
at Risk?, 10 PAC. RIM. L. & POL’Y J. 781 (2001).  
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on the subject. The decision to include a particular profession 
was based on a number of factors including: (1) entry to most 
typically involves passing a national exam with a significant 
legal component, (2) the services provided by the profession may 
also be provided by bengoshi lawyers (those who have passed 
the NBE), (3) some are included as rinsetsu shigyō [neighboring 
professions] when the other professions are mentioned in the 
context of the “hōsō’ population problem” Since most of these 
professions have qualifying exams with pass rates well below 
20%, and some have even taken to officially referring to 
themselves in English as “lawyer” or “attorney ,” the author 
(who has only passed American-style bar exams with much, 
much higher pass rates) will dispense with the condescending 
past practice of referring to them as “scriveners” or “quasi-” or 
“para-” anything.  
1. Bengoshi Lawyers and Other Hōsō (most judges 
and prosecutors).  
As already noted, the term hōsō refers to the three “elite” 
legal professions whose members have passed the bar exam. 
Passing the bar exam together with completion of the required 
course of training at the Supreme Court’s Legal Research and 
Training Institute (LRTI) renders a person eligible to register as 
a lawyer. 85  Most judges and prosecutors are chosen by the 
respective bureaucracies (the prosecutor’s agency or the 
judiciary) from the eligible pool of candidates at the LRTI, with 
the bulk of the remainder becoming lawyers. 86  Judges and 
prosecutors typically spend much of their career in their chosen 
branch of the government and, having passed the NBE and 
graduated from the LRTI, are entitled to register as lawyers 
  
 85. Bengoshihō [Attorney Act], Law No. 205 of 1949, art. 4 (Japan), 
English translation available at http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/ 
law/detail/?id=1878&vm=04&re=02&new=1.  
 86. See generally JAPANESE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, BASIC INFORMATION 
ON THE POPULATION OF HŌSŌ, available at http://www.moj.go.jp/content/ 
000102262.pdf (describing differences among Japanese lawyers).  
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when they reach retirement age. Thus, becoming a lawyer is 
itself one post-retirement option for judges and prosecutors who 
have passed the NBE. For purposes of the discussion that follow, 
however, it is important to appreciate that not all judges have 
passed the bar exam: it is not a requirement for Supreme Court 
justices and summary court judges. Neither have all prosecutors, 
since assistant prosecutors who have not passed the bar but 
passed a separate promotion exam may function as full 
prosecutors and even become lawyers. 
Bengoshi lawyers are governed primarily by the Attorney 
Act. Under Article 3(1) of the act, the scope of their activities is 
described as being:  
[U]pon the request of the party or the concerned parties, or 
upon the entrustment of public agency, shall be to engage in 
acts relating to lawsuits, non-contentious cases, and 
objections, request for re-examination, appeals, and other 
petitions against administrative agencies and other general 
legal services.87 
Their relationship to the other legal professions is 
complicated by the fact that the “unlicensed practice of law” is 
defined more expansively in Article 72 of the Attorney Act as 
anyone but a licensed bengoshi lawyer:  
[F]or the purpose of obtaining compensation, engag[ing] in the 
business of providing legal advice or representation, handling 
arbitration matters, aiding in conciliation, or providing other 
legal services in connection with any lawsuits, non-
contentious cases, or objections, requesting for re-
examination, appeals and other petitions against administrative 
  
 87. Bengoshihō [Attorney Act], Law No. 205 of 1949, art. 3(1) (Japan), 
English translation available at http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/ 
detail/?id=1878&vm=04&re=02&new=1.  
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agencies, etc., or other general legal services, or acting as an 
intermediary in such matters.88 
Through the Attorney Act or the laws governing some of the 
other professions, bengoshi lawyers are also able to provide the 
same services as other professions. 89  In one sense, therefore, 
bengoshi are special in that they are able to provide the broadest 
range of professional services. 90  More importantly, however, 
they are the only legal profession able to represent clients in 
significant civil litigation as well as criminal and administrative 
litigation.  
2. Shihō shoshi (Judicial Scriveners/Shihoshoshi 
Lawyers).  
“Judicial scriveners” has been the traditional English title for 
this profession though such a demeaning term fails to do justice 
to the reality that for most of its members, joining the profession 
involves passing one of the most competitive law exams in the 
world: in 2013 it had a pass rate of just 3%. Moreover, the 
profession has taken to referring to itself officially in English as 
“lawyers” albeit with the largely meaningless addition of the 
  
 88. Article 72 does exclude instances provided for in other laws, which 
is presumably the exception that allows the other professions discussed in this 
article to provide legal services. Id. art. 72.  
 89. The manner in which bengoshi lawyers can provide the services 
open to other legal professions depends upon the statute governing the specific 
profession. In some cases bengoshi lawyers can simply provide the service 
while in others merely being a bengoshi entitles registration as a member of the 
other profession without satisfying any further qualifying requirements (e.g. 
test passage, etc.).  
 90. There is also a system for qualifying foreign lawyers to register 
with Japanese bar associations and practice as foreign legal consultants. Since 
the number of such professionals is few and they are not relevant to the overall 
subject of this article they are not discussed further. Gaikokubengoshi ni yoru 
hōritsu jimu no toriatsukai ni kansuru tokubetu socchihō [Act on Special 
Measures concerning the Handling of Legal Services by Foreign Lawyers], 
Law No. 66 of 1986 (Japan), English translation available at 
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=1918&vm=04&re=02&
new=1. 
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romanized version of their Japanese title. This comes after a 
brief period where they tried to refer to themselves as 
“solicitors” which might be the better term, given that as with 
solicitors in England and Wales they are similarly associated 
with documentation and conveyancing transactions.  
Shihoshoshi lawyers also provide a wide range of other legal 
services, though under their enabling act they are most closely 
associated with professional services related to real property 
title-related registration and filings with the system of corporate 
registries, both of which are conducted at a nationwide network 
of hōmukyoku (Legal Affairs Bureaus), which are under the 
jurisdiction of the MOJ.91 They are also able to provide other 
services. For example, on trains it is common to see 
advertisements for debt-resolution services by shihoshoshi 
lawyers. 92  On their English language web-site the Japan 
Federation of Shihoshoshi Lawyer’s Associations indicates that 
their members can help buy a home, set up a company, resolve 
disputes with landlords, seek compensation for traffic injuries, 
help with employment disputes or even naturalize as a Japanese 
citizen.93 This seems broader than the range of services set forth 
in the Shihoshoshi Lawyer Act, yet doubtless reflects the 
realities of their practice.94 Under the Act, shihoshoshi lawyers 
who pass an additional certifying exam may also represent 
clients in small claims civil litigation in summary courts.95 
  
 91. Shihōshoshihō [Judicial Scrivener Act], Law No. 197 of 1950, art. 
4 (Japan).  
 92. Since bengoshi lawyers also advertise the same services, it is clear 
that there is overlap and competition at least between these two professions. 
Furthermore, one can get a sense of the demographics of a particular train line 
from whether the advertising for such services is from bengoshi or shihoshoshi 
(the author has never seen advertisements from both professions on the same 
train).  
 93. See JAPAN FED’N SHIHO-SHOSHI LAWS’ ASS’N, http://www.shiho-
shoshi.or.jp/english/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2014). 
 94. Shihōshoshihō [Judicial Scrivener Act], Law No. 197 of 1950, art. 
3 (Japan). 
 95. Id. 
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3. Tochikaoku Chōsashi (Land and House 
Investigators). 
As their name suggests, land and house investigators is a fairly 
specialized profession whose remit is limited to real estate 
transactions and the arcana of the cadastral property registration 
system.96 They are included for a number of reasons: they are 
considered “neighboring licensed professions” (rinsetsu 
shigyō),97 the profession has roots that intersect with Shihoshoshi 
lawyers, 98 and they now offer ADR services for boundary and 
other disputes involving real property. 99 Furthermore, the 
  
 96. See generally JAPAN FED’N OF LAND AND HOUSE INVESTIGATORS’ 
ASS’N, CREATING FUNDAMENTAL INFORMATION FOR NATIONAL AND CITY 
PLANNING, PROTECTING PEOPLE’S PROPERTY OF LAND AND BUILDINGS, AND 
SECURING PEOPLE’S RIGHTS TO PROPERTY (2006), available at 
http://www.chosashi.or.jp/img/outline_e.pdf (describing role of Shihoshoshi 
lawyers). http://www.chosashi.or.jp/img/outline_e.pdf. 
 97. See, e.g., MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE JAPANESE LEGAL 
PROFESSION 25 (2012), available at 
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=4&cad=
rja&ved=0CDwQFjAD&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.moj.go.jp%2Fcontent%2
F000097613.pdf&ei=Jh0XU6j0F6WbygGfmIDIBw&usg=AFQjCNG7Z774nvt
HSGRvea3NHdrdXy0bZA&sig2=dhDmz1Tm-
T3VoNGSweiGmQ&bvm=bv.62286460,d.aWM. 
 98. Historically, the profession worked with two separate property 
recording systems: one for title, rights and interests, another maintained for tax 
purposes. When these two systems were combined into the current unified 
system, it would have potentially resulted in a significant portion of the 
business of the shihōshoshi lawyers. A compromise was reached that 
guaranteed both professions an income under the new system. See generally 
NIHON SHIHŌSHOSHISHI (SENGOHEN) [POST-WAR HISTORY OF JAPANESE 
SHIHŌSHOSHI LAWYERS] 997-1031 (2011). An apparent byproduct of this 
history is a provision in the Shihōshoshi Lawyer Act which limits Shihōshoshi 
Lawyers to providing and advisory and non-litigation representative services 
relating to boundary matters involving real estate below a defined value with 
bigger properties being reserved to the House and Building Investigators, 
whose scope is unrestricted. Shihōshoshihō [Judicial Scrivener Law], Law No. 
197 of 1950, art. 3(1)(viii) (Japan); see Tochikaokuchōsashihō [Land and 
House Investigators Act], Law No. 228 of 1950, art. 3(1)(iv) (Japan).  
 99. See Alternative Dispute Resolution-related Disclosure, FED’N LAND 
& HOUSE INSPECTOR ASS’N, http://www.chosashi.or.jp/adr/ (last visited Feb. 22, 
2014) (Japan).  
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qualifying exam does involve a significant legal component, 
together with geometry problems that would doubtless horrify 
the many American lawyers who (mistakenly) went to law 
school to avoid math.100 
4. Gyōsei shoshi Administrative Scriveners.  
According to the Administrative Scriveners Act, members of 
this profession may perform the following services: (i) preparing 
and submitting documents for filings with government agencies, 
to the extent not prohibited by other laws,101 (ii) representing 
clients before such agencies in the filing process, (iii) preparation 
of contracts and documents on behalf of clients and (iv) advising 
clients in connection with preparing such documents.102 In reality 
they provide a wide range of document preparation, non-litigious 
representation and advisory services.103 In fact, they may even 
help prepare court documents for clients intending to represent 
themselves in family court or other civil proceedings. 104  The 
significant potential for overlap and encroachment may explain 
why complaints against administrative scriveners by bengoshi 
lawyers for Attorney Act violations are a staple news item.105 
  
 100. JAPANESE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, TOCHIKAOKU CHŌSASHI [LAND AND 
HOUSE INVESTIGATORS QUALIFYING EXAM REQUIREMENTS] § 3(2) (Japan), 
available at http://www.moj.go.jp/content/000110040.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 
2014).  
 101. Gyoseishoshihō [Administrative Scrivener Act], No. 4 of 1951, art. 
1-1 (Japan) (for example, even though the Legal Affairs Bureau to which 
documents related to real estate transactions are filed is a “government 
agency,” those services are reserved to Gyoseishoshi lawyers and Land and 
Building Investigators, so cannot be engaged in by Administrative Scriveners).  
 102. See generally id. arts. 1-2. 
 103. OSAKA GYOSEI-SHOSHI LAW. ASS’N, http://www.osaka-
gyoseishoshi.or.jp/global/english.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2014).  
 104. Id. 
 105. E.g., HP ni “kotsujiko sodan ukeru” bengoshiho ihan de 
gyoseishoshi ni keikokusho hyogoken bengoshi kai [Hyogō Prefecture Bar 
Association Sends Written Warning to Administrative Scrivener for Violating 
the Attorney Act by Advertising “Accepting Traffic Accident Consultations” on 
Home Page], MSN SANKEI (Feb. 6, 2013), http://sankei.jp.msn.com/west/west 
_affairs/news/130206/waf13020609310009-n1.htm (Japan). 
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In 2000, the Federation of Administrative Scriveners 
Associations (“FASA”) reportedly attempted to go the same 
route as judicial scriveners by adopting “gyoseishoshi lawyers” 
as the official English name for their profession.106 Use by the 
FASA of this title soon stopped however, reportedly due to 
pressure from the Japan Federation of Bar Associations 
(JFBA).107 Some administrative scriveners still use the English 
term “gyoseishoshi lawyer” or “administrative lawyer” or “law 
office” in marketing to non-Japanese clients (immigration-law 
related filings are the bread and butter of many members of the 
profession).108  
In fact, because administrative scriveners perform a wide 
range of legal services for both Japanese and non-Japanese 
clients alike, many may have trouble understanding the 
difference between the two professions. 109  This confusion is 
further enhanced by the fact that the Japanese terms used for 
bengoshi law firm (hōritsu jimushō) and administrative 
scrivener’s office (hōmujimushō) are very similar. 110  In 
  
 106. See sources cited, supra Part V.B.4. 
 107. Kennichi Miyahara, “Gyoseishoshi Lawyer” ko [Thinking about 
“Gyoseishoshi Lawyer”], EONET (Feb. 5, 2005), http://www.eonet.ne.jp/~ 
gyoseisyoshi-m/gyoseishoshilawyer.htm. 
 108. Id. 
 109. E.g., id. (as of July 2013, the English website of the Osaka-
Gyoseishoshi Lawyer’s Association explained that Gyoseishoshi-lawyers could 
provide assistance in a wide variety of situations including: immigration and 
naturalization, incorporation, preparation of employment-related documents, 
numerous types of license applications and regulatory filings, preparation of 
wills, insurance claims, copyright, “documents to file a suit” and “various 
contracts”).  
 110. “Hōritsu jimushō” literally means “law office” while 
“Hōmujimusho” would typically be translated “Legal affairs office.” The 
confusion is confounded by the fact that becoming an administrative scrivener 
may be an option for persons who graduate from law school but are unable to 
pass the NBE (in an effort to prevent the build-up of an ever-increasing number 
of repeat takers who would inexorably drive the NBE pass rate down, law 
school graduates are barred by law from taking the exam more than three 
times). It is thus not unusual to see a Legal Affairs Office whose principal 
lawyer has graduated with a JD from law school (which most people associate 
with becoming a lawyer) but who is not actually a bengoshi. Users of legal 
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Japanese, Administrative Scriveners associations sometimes 
advertise the profession to the public as “[y]our local law 
practitioner” (machi no hōritsuka).  
5. Shakaihoken rōmushi (Labor and Social Security 
Attorneys).  
Shakai hoken romushi are another legal profession that has 
been missed in some prior accounts of the legal professions 
despite having taken to referring themselves as “attorneys” in 
English. Under Article 2 of the Labor and Social Security 
Attorneys Act, this profession is licensed to provide a wide 
variety of services relating to the preparation and filing of 
documents relating to labor, employment, pension and other 
statutory benefit programs.111 Pursuant to a 2004 amendment to 
related laws, labor and social security attorneys who pass an 
additional qualifying exam may also represent clients in ADR 
and pretrial employment dispute proceedings, provided that if 
the amount in dispute exceeds a defined threshold a bengoshi 
lawyer must be involved as co-counsel.112  
6. Zeirishi (Certified Public Tax Accountants 
(attorneys)).  
Specializing in tax law, zeirishi are a type of professional who 
effectively straddle the border between tax lawyers and tax 
accountants. Although their formal English title is “certified tax 
accountant ,” individual members of the profession may refer to 
themselves (at least in their website URLs) as “tax lawyers” or 
  
services would doubtless have been even more baffled if the shihoshoshi 
lawyers had been successful in their campaign to change the name of their 
profession to “homushi” (legal affairs specialist). Shihōshoshi kaimei no ugoki 
[Shihoshoshi Lawyers Moving to Change Their Names], ASAHI SHINBUN, Apr. 
19, 2008, (evening ed.), at 9.  
 111. Shakai hoken romushi hō [Labor and Social Security Attorney 
Act], Law No. 89 of 1968 (Japan). 
 112. Id. arts. 2(1)(i-6), 2(2). 
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“tax law consultants.” 113  They are considered a “legal 
profession” for a number of reasons. First, under the Tax 
Accountant Act, it is clear that they are heavily involved in 
advising about tax laws and the preparation and filing of tax-
related documents with taxing authorities.114 Second, they can 
play a role in tax litigation as a sort of “junior counsel” role to 
bengoshi lawyers. 115  Third, licensed bengoshi lawyers may 
engage in the practice of a zeirishi. 116  Finally, the range of 
services offered by zeirishi includes many that would be 
associated with lawyers or solicitors in other countries. 
According to the English website of the Japan Federation of 
Certified Public Tax Accountants Associations, in addition to a 
wide range of tax related documentation and representative 
activities these services include: preparing corporate and 
accounting documents, acting as auditors for local government 
authorities and acting as guardians in adult guardian 
proceedings.117 
  
 113. E.g., TAXLAWYER-KASHIWA, http://www.taxlawyer-kashiwa.com/ 
(last visited Feb. 22, 2014) (Japan) (a search of “tax lawyer” and zeirishi 
generate a number of professional office URLs using some combination of 
“taxlawyer”); TAKAHASHI-TAXLAW, http://www.takahashi-taxlaw.jp/ (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2014) (Japan) (an example of a member of the profession 
calling itself a “Tax Law Consulting” office); JAPAN FED’N OF CERTIFIED PUB. 
TAX ACCTS. ASS’N, http://www.nichizeiren.or.jp/guidance/plus/interchange. 
html (last visited Feb. 22, 2014) (on its website the federation acknowledges 
that the term “tax accountant” may not adequately convey to English speakers 
the scope of the profession’s services).  
 114. Zeirishihō [Tax Accountant Act], Law No. 237 of 1951, art. 2 
(Japan). 
 115. Id. art. 2-2 (Tax Accountants may act in trials as “assistants” 
[hosanin] to lawyers, though their statements are considered “representative” in 
being treated as statements of their client or the lawyer). 
 116. Id. art. 3(1)(3) The fact that it is apparently possible for a bengoshi 
lawyer to become a zeirishi without ever cracking a book on tax or accounting 
helps to illustrate that the qualification requirements for at least some of the 
legal professions may have more to do with moderating between vested 
interests than protecting clients from unqualified practitioners.  
 117. JAPAN FED’N OF CERTIFIED PUB. TAX ACCTS. ASS’N, 
http://www.nichizeiren.or.jp/eng/index.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2014) 
(demonstrating that some firms may provide a full-range of corporate services 
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7. Benrishi (Patent Attorney).  
As the name suggests, patent attorneys are legally empowered 
to provide a wide range of services relating to patents and other 
forms of intellectual property, including not just preparation of 
applications and filing, but acting in a representative capacity in 
the preparation of licensing agreements and other contracts 
related to intellectual property rights.118 They may also provide 
ADR-related services and, since 2002, patent attorneys who have 
passed an additional qualifying exam may act as co-counsel with 
bengoshi lawyers in patent litigation.119 
8. Kaijidairishi (Marine Commission Procedure 
Agent/Maritime Attorney).  
Another profession that has often been left out of the 
description of Japan’s “other” professions is the Marine 
Commission Procedure Agent (MCPA). Although they are 
something of a niche profession, they should be included 
nonetheless.120 Sometimes called the “shihōshoshi lawyer of the 
sea” (umi no shihōshoshi) or the “administrative scrivener of the 
sea,”121 this profession may act on behalf of clients by preparing 
regulatory documents and filing them with government agencies 
under a specified range of laws relating to ships and maritime 
  
that include corporate secretarial documentation services together with tax 
filings).  
 118. Benrishihō [Patent Attorney Act], Law No. 49 of 2000, art. 4(1) 
(Japan), translated in Patent Attorney Act (Apr. 26, 2000), available at 
http://www.jpaa.or.jp/english/aboutus/pdf/PatentAttorneyAct.pdf. 
 119. Id. art. 6-2(1).  
 120. The author first learned of the profession’s existence not from any 
scholarship on the Japanese legal system, but because one appeared as a 
character in Naniwa no kinyūdō, a popular Japanese comic book about an 
Osaka money-lending firm. 
 121. See, e.g., Maritime Agency Workers, HASEGAWA LAW OFFICE, 
http://hasegawa-office.jimdo.com/2013/01/09/%E6%B5%B7%E4%BA%8B% 
E4%BB%A3%E7%90%86%E5%A3%AB/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2014).  
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personnel (including labor-related issues).122 With the decrease 
in number of Japanese-flagged ships, this profession is reported 
to be in decline.123 It is not uncommon to see a single person 
being qualified as both a MCPA and as an Administrative 
Scrivener or other profession.  
9. Tsūkanshi (Customs Broker).  
Customs brokers are included for a number of reasons. First, 
becoming a customs broker generally involves passing a law-
based exam. 124  Furthermore, the range of services customs 
brokerage houses are allowed to engage in under the Customs 
Brokering Act clearly include what would generally be 
considered “legal services” – including not only preparing and 
filing various customs and trade related documentation, but also 
filing pre-trial objections to dispositions by customs 
authorities. 125  Finally, both bengoshi lawyers and patent 
attorneys are exempt from the registration requirement of the 
Customs Brokering Act, meaning that tsūkanshi are another 
profession where an overlap (and competition) among 
professions has been anticipated.126  
  
 122. Kaijidairishihō [Marine Commission Procedure Agent Act], Law 
No. 32 of 1951, art. 1 (Japan).  
 123. This observation is based primarily on the author’s discussions with 
a representative of the profession’s trade association in 2009, but it is also 
suggested by the dramatic decline in the number of Japanese seamen (from 
233,700 in 1980 to 67,165 in 2011) and the dramatic decline in the number of 
Japanese-flagged cargo vessels having a tonnage of 2,000 tons or more from 
3,016 in 1970 to 136 in 2011. The statistics are from the Japanese Shipowner’s 
Association, http://www.jsanet.or.jp/data/data.html#genjou (last visited Feb. 5, 
2014).  
 124. Custom Agency Exam Description § 1.2, JAPAN CUSTOMS, 
http://www.customs.go.jp/tsukanshi/46_shiken/46annai.pdf.  
 125. Tsukanshihō [Customs Brokering Act], Law No. 122 of 1967, art. 1 
(Japan). 
 126. Id. art. 3(5). 
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10. Kaijihosanin (Marine Tribunal Assessor).  
An obscure maritime-related legal profession is that of the 
kaijihosanin, who effectively acts as a lawyer before marine 
accident tribunals.127 Unlike the other professions discussed in 
this article, there is no national qualifying or selection exam to 
become a kaijihosanin and the profession is not governed by a 
specific statutory regime. Instead, they are provided for in a 
subsection of the Maritime Tribunal Act and subsidiary 
regulations.128 Eligibility to register as a kaijihosanin is based on 
having certain designated types of professional experience, 
including having certain kinds of marine qualifications, having 
been a magistrate (kaijishinpankan or rijikan) on a maritime 
tribunal, or having had experience as a teacher at various 
designated types of marine-related educational bodies. Bengoshi 
lawyers may also register as kaijihosanin, which is the principle 
reason for their inclusion as a category of legal qualification.129  
11. Kōshōnin (Public Notaries). 
The last profession to be discussed in this section is public 
notaries or kōshōnin. Kōshōnin are not like American notaries 
who simply verify signatures, though that is a service kōshōnin 
do provide. Rather, it is a very old profession based on European 
models, including the French Notary Rule of 1886 and also 
heavily influence by the system in the Netherlands.130 Kōshōnin 
perform a number of functions related to the commercial registry 
system administered by the MOJ, including authenticating the 
  
 127. See Explanation, MINISTRY OF LAND INFRASTRUCTURE TRANSP. & 
TOURISM, http://www.mlit.go.jp/jmat/annai/ 
hosanin/hosanin.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2014).  
 128. Kaijishinpanhō [Maritime Tribunal Act], Law No. 135 of 1947, 
arts. 19-23. (Japan). 
 129. Kaijishinpanhō shikō kisoku [Maritime Tribunal Act Implementing 
Regulations] Ministry of Transportation ordinance No. 8 of 1948. (Japan). 
 130. How to make good use of Japanese Notaries, JAPAN NAT’L 
NOTARIES ASS’N, http://www.koshonin.gr.jp/index2.html (last visited Feb. 16, 
2014) (listing updated English publication information).  
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articles of incorporation of a new company as well as a wide 
range of other legal documents such as wills and promissory 
notes. 131  Authentication of certain types of documents by a 
public notary results in the documents having the same effect as 
a confirmed court judgment.132 For example, an authenticated 
promissory note or other evidence of debt containing an 
enforcement clause can be executed directly against the 
debtor.133 Unlike the other professions described in this Article, 
public notaries are appointed by the Minister of Justice to 
specific notarial districts and are a special category of public 
servant, one whose compensation is derived exclusively from 
notarial fees rather than the public purse, as discussed in more 
detail in the next section.134 They are included in this section 
because as with other private sector professions, their income is 
derived from fees paid by private parties for legal services.  
C. Private Sector Legal Professions as a Retirement Plan 
As the preceding discussion should make clear, Japan’s 
market for legal services is supplied by a wide variety of 
licensed professionals, most of whom offer a fairly narrow range 
of expertise and capabilities. Another way of looking at it, 
  
 131. Id.; Kokkakōmuinhō [National Public Service Act], Law No. 120 
of 1947, art. 2(3)(xiii) (Japan), English translation available at MINISTRY OF 
JUST. (Apr. 1, 2009), 
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?ft=1&re=01&dn=1&x=0&
y=0&co=01&ky=%E5%9B%BD%E5%AE%B6%E5%85%AC%E5%8B%99
%E5%93%A1%E6%B3%95&page=5. 
 132. See source cited, supra note 132.  
 133. Minji shikkō hō [Civil Execution Act], Law No. 4 of 1979, art. 22 
(Japan).  
 134. Kōshōninhō [Public Notaries Act], Law No. 53 of 1908, arts. 11-
13, 13-2 (Japan). Interestingly, despite having been amended a number of 
times, most recently in 2011, the Public Notaries Act has never been rewritten 
in modern standard Japanese as has been the case with most other Japanese 
statutes that were first passed in the pre-war period. Thus, despite now 
providing for the notarization of electronic records, it remains written in the 
archaic form of statutory Japanese which the average person would likely find 
difficult to read (perhaps that is the point!).  
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however, might be to regard the multitude of licensed legal 
professions as a manifestation of the overall vertically-integrated 
nature of Japanese economic regulation. Put even more simply, 
most of the leading ministries essentially have their own captive 
legal profession – the MOJ has several, as is shown in the table 
that follows. The “ownership” of a particular profession can be 
readily identified through the ministry that has jurisdiction over 
the statute governing the profession.  
A search for information about how to qualify for any of 
these professions will typically lead to the nuts and bolts of 
sitting for and passing the relevant exam, most of which are 
highly competitive. What is rarely mentioned, however, is that 
there is a back door into virtually all of the legal professions, 
with the exception of the hōsō triumvirate of bengoshi lawyers, 
judges and prosecutors. The backdoor involves being an ex-
bureaucrat, typically from the ministry regulating the profession. 
A reading of the respective governing statutes reveals that each 
of the non-hōsō legal professions is open to persons having 
requisite governmental experience. Those who qualify through 
this other route may either register without testing at all or 
receive a waiver of some or even all testing requirements. The 
professions thus serve as a form of amakudari.  
In the interests of efficiency, the relevant information is set 
forth below: 
 
Profession Regulator Testing Exemption 
Test Pass 
Rate135 
Population 
2012/2013 
Shihoshoshi Lawyer MOJ Yes136 3% 20,670137 
  
 135. In order to avoid more citations than already appear in this table, 
unless otherwise noted the pass rate information for all qualifications is derived 
from information published on the applicable ministry website for the results of 
the 2012 exam for the profession indicated (all pass rates are rounded to the 
nearest whole percentage point).  
 136. Under Article 4(ii) of the Shihōshoshi Lawyer Act, persons having 
ten years or more experience as judicial clerks (saibanshōshokikan), judicial 
administrators (saibanshōjimukan), Ministry of Justice administrators 
(hōmujimukan) or prosecutorial administrators (kensatsu jimukan) or “other 
persons having equal or greater experience as designated by the MOJ” can 
register as shihōshoshi lawyers without passing the test if they are approved by 
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Profession Regulator Testing Exemption 
Test Pass 
Rate135 
Population 
2012/2013 
Land and Building 
Investigator MOJ Yes
138 8% 17,200139 
Administrative 
Scrivener MIC Yes
140 9%141 42,177142 
Labor and Social Ministry of Yes143 7% 36,850144 
  
the Minister of Justice or the head of the local Legal Affairs Bureau, depending 
upon the circumstances. See sources cited supra notes 91, 93.  
 137. Other Membership Data Collection, JAPAN FED’N SHIHŌ-SHOSHI 
LAW’S’ ASS’NS, http://www.shiho-shoshi.or.jp/association/intro/rengoukai 
_data.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2014) (referencing 2012 data). 
 138. Under Article 4(ii) of the Land and Building Investigator’s Act, and 
Article 8 of its implementing regulations, persons having at least 10 years’ 
relevant experience at a Legal Affairs Bureau and demonstrating adequate 
knowledge are eligible to register without testing. Tochikaokuchōsashihō [Land 
and House Investigators Act], Law No. 228 of 1950, art. 4(ii) (Japan).  
 139. Message from the Chairman, JAPAN FED’N OF LAND AND HOUSE 
INVESTIGATOR’S ASS’NS, http://www.chosashi.or.jp/gaiyou/message.html (last 
visited Feb. 14, 2014) (approximate number for 2013, according to industry 
federation website). 
 140. In addition to allowing bengoshi lawyers, patent attorneys, 
chartered accountants and certified public tax accountants to register as 
administrative scriveners without testing, the Administrative Scriveners Act 
accords a similar privilege to a wide range of persons who have 20 years or 
more experience in a variety of public service positions (only 17 years for high 
school graduates) without taking any exam. Gyōseishoshihō [Administrative 
Scrivener Act], No. 4 of 1951, arts. 2, 6 (Japan). 
 141. Judicial Scrivener Test Result List, JAPAN FED’N ADMIN. 
SCRIVENERS, http://gyosei-shiken.or.jp/gokaku/ichiran.htm (last visited Mar. 
31, 2014) (Pass rate data is from website of the foundation that administers the 
exam). 
 142. JAPAN FED’N CERTIFIED ADMIN. PROCEDURES LEGAL SPECIALIST 
ASS’NS, http://www.gyosei.or.jp/information/unit/membership.html (last visited 
Feb. 18, 2014). 
 143. The Labor and Social Security Attorney Act requires persons 
seeking to qualify for the profession to pass an exam on specified areas of law 
and also includes an attachment exempting persons having the requisite amount 
of experience (typically 5, 10 or 15 years) in employment, labor and benefits-
related roles in national or local government agencies. Arts. 3, 9, 11, Schedule 
2. The Act specifically envisions that some persons will be exempted from all 
subjects and be eligible to join the provision without testing. Art. 3(1)(ii). 
Bengoshi lawyers are also eligible for registering without testing. Art. 3 (2).  
 144. JAPAN FED’N LABOR & SOCIAL SECURITY ATT’YS’ ASS’NS, 
http://www.shakaihokenroumushi.jp/index.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2014). 
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Profession Regulator Testing Exemption 
Test Pass 
Rate135 
Population 
2012/2013 
Security Attorney Health Welfare 
& Labor 
Certified Public Tax 
Accountant 
Ministry of 
Finance 
(National Tax 
Agency) 
Yes145 18%146 73,524147 
Patent Attorney METI (Patent Agency) Yes
148 6% 10,128149 
  
 145. Certified Public Tax Accountant is the most open of the legal 
professions, which may explain why it is also has the most members. Zeirishihō 
[Certified Public Tax Accountants Act], Law No. 99 of 2007, arts. 3(1)(ii), 7, 8 
(Japan) (these articles establish a broad range of exemptions from the testing 
requirement for persons who have done academic research or have 10 or 15 or 
more years of experience in a wide range of tax-related government jobs.) The 
Act specifically envisions that some persons will register based on an 
exemption of all subjects tested on the exam. Id. 
 146. 18% is the national average which does not take into account the 
various exemptions available for certain tested subjects. The average pass rate 
taking into all subjects actually tested was 15%. Fiscal Year 2012 (62nd) Tax 
Accountant Test Results, NAT’L TAX AGENCY, http://www.nta.go.jp/sonota/ 
zeirishi/zeirishishiken/shikenkekka2012/01.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2014).  
 147. JAPAN FED’N CERTIFIED PUBLIC TAX ACCTS’ ASS’NS, 2013 data 
from http://www.nichizeiren.or.jp/guidance/intro/registrant.html (last visited 
Feb. 18, 2014) (providing data from 2013).  
 148. Under Article 7 of the Patent Attorney Act, bengoshi lawyers are 
qualified to be patent attorneys without having to pass the qualifying exam, as 
are persons who have “engaged in the trial or examination affairs as a trial 
examiner or examiner at the Japan Patent Office for a total of seven or more 
years.” Benrishihō [Patent Attorney Act], Law No. 49 of 2000, art. 7 (Japan), 
English translation available at Patent Attorney Act (Apr. 26, 2000), 
http://www.jpaa.or.jp/english/aboutus/pdf/PatentAttorneyAct.pdf. 
 149. JAPAN PATENT ATT’Y ASS’N, http://www.jpaa.or.jp/ (last visited 
Feb. 19, 2014) (providing data from 2013).  
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Profession Regulator Testing Exemption 
Test Pass 
Rate135 
Population 
2012/2013 
Marine Procedure 
Commission Agent 
Minister of 
Land 
Infrastructure 
Transportation 
and Tourism 
Yes150 50%151 At least 345 + 152 
Customs Broker 
Ministry of 
Finance 
(National Tax 
Agency) 
Partial153 7% 7,366154 
  
 150. Persons having at least 10 years government experience deemed 
suitable by the Minister of Land Infrastructure Transportation and Tourism may 
register without the exam. Kaijidairishihō [Marine Commission Procedure 
Agent Act], Law No. 32 of 1951, art. 2(ii) (Japan). 
 151. KAIJI AGENCY ATT’YS’ ASS’N, http://jmpcaa.org/main/24-5.php 
(last visited Feb. 14, 2014). 
 152. The number given is that of members of the Marine Procedures 
Commission Agent Association for 2013 as disclosed on the association’s 
website. Notice of Membership List Update, KAJI AGENCY ATT’YS’ ASS’N, 
http://jmpcaa.org/main/300/post-21.php (last visited Feb. 16, 2014). Unlike 
most of the other professions for which it is mandatory to be a member of a 
prefectural professional association, marine procedures commission agents are 
not subject to such a requirement, meaning association membership data does 
not reflect the entire population.  
 153. The customs broker qualifying exam tests knowledge of customs, 
tariff and other trade-related statutes, the preparation of customs-related 
documents and the Customs Brokering Act itself. Tsukanshihō [Customs 
Brokering Act], Law No. 122 of 1967, art. 23(2) (Japan). Persons having 15 or 
more years` experience in a customs-brokering related job or related 
government experience need only pass the test on the Act itself while those 
with 5 or more years’ experience are exempted from the “practical” 
(documentation preparation) component of the exam. Id. art. 24(i)-(ii).  
 154. The 2013 data is available on the Japan Customs website. Current 
Status of the 8101 Customs Officer, JAPAN CUSTOMS, http://www.customs.go. 
jp/tetsuzuki/c-answer/shiken/8101_jr.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2014). 
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Profession Regulator Testing Exemption 
Test Pass 
Rate135 
Population 
2012/2013 
Kaijihosanin 
Ministry of 
Land 
Infrastructure 
Transportation 
and Tourism 
No test155 n/a Approx. 1,000?156 
Public Notary MOJ Yes, but no n/a Approx. 500 
Bengoshi Lawyer None No157 25%158 35,105159 
 
  
 155. There is no test for this profession, but those eligible to register for 
it include persons with experience as maritime tribunal magistrates. Eligibility 
for those positions includes persons with clearly defined degrees of maritime-
related public service experience. Kaijishinpanhō shikorei [Marine Tribunal 
Act Implementation Ordinance], Cabinet Ordinance No. 54 of 1948, art. 2 
(Japan); Kaijishinpanhō kisoku [Marine Tribunal Act Implementing 
Regulations], art. 19(ii) (Japan). 
 156. Recent numbers have not proved readily available, and there is no 
professional federation. A publication on the MLIT website gives the number 
of registered Kaijihosanin as of the end of 2000 as 1,078 (a number that 
includes 418 bengoshi lawyers). Marine Accident Report, MINISTRY OF LAND, 
INFRASTRUCTURE, & TOURISM, available at http://www.mlit.go.jp/jtsb/kai/ 
genkyou/report_top.html.  
 157. Technically there are two ways of becoming a bengoshi lawyer 
without having passed the NBE. The first is to have been a justice on the 
Supreme Court of Japan (for which NBE passage is not a formal prerequisite). 
Bengoshi Hō [Attorney Act], Law No. 205 of 1949, art. 6. (Japan). The second 
is to have been an assistant prosecutor (fukukenji – a category of prosecution 
agency official who has not passed the NBE) who passes an exam qualifying 
them to become a prosecutor (kensatsukan). Although most prosecutors have 
passed the NBE, the Attorneys Act allows prosecutors who have qualified in 
this fashion and have worked for at least five years as full prosecutors are 
eligible to register as bengoshi lawyers. Id. art. 5(3)(iii); Kensatsuchohō 
[Prosecutors Act], Law No. 61 of 1947, art. 18(3) (Japan). 
 158. Pass rate is derived from information published on the website of 
the Ministry of Justice, which administers the NBE. The Results of the Bar 
Exam 2012, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, http://www.moj.go.jp/jinji/shihoushiken/ 
jinji08_00063.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2014).  
 159. The 2013 data is available on the Japan Federation of Bar 
Associations website. Member of the Japan Federation of Bar Associations, 
JFBA, http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/jfba_info/membership/about.html (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
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The following information from formal responses to written 
inquiries made by the author to some of the relevant professional 
federations in 2010 is indicative. In 2009 1,511 people newly 
registered as administrative scriveners based on passing the 
exam while 613 did so based on government experience. In the 
same year, 895 persons registered as Gyoseishoshi lawyers based 
on exam passage while 130 did so through approval based on 
government experience. Similarly, of the 8,608 total number of 
patent attorneys registered as of April 30, 2010, 633 had done so 
based on patent agency experience compared to 7,759 who did 
so after passing the exam. As of March 31, 2010, 8,630 of the 
certified tax accountants registered at the time (over 10% of the 
total) qualified through based on government tax administration 
experience rather than test passage or other means. Of the 2,642 
newly registered zeirishi in 2009, 864 registered based on 
government experience rather than testing.160 
Thus, although the numbers are generally not large compared 
to the total for each profession, they still represent a significant 
amakudari component in each profession queried. If only one or 
two amakudari board members can potentially change the 
corporate governance dynamic of a company or the role played 
by a foundation, the fact that each legal profession represents a 
vested interest of its supervising ministry means that the 
numbers do not necessarily need to be large to influence the way 
the various qualifying systems are operated and interact with 
each other.161  
  
 160. Responses on file with author.  
 161. A similar comment should be made about the process of qualifying 
as a Bengoshi lawyer, which generally requires completion of a course of 
training at the LRTI which is best thought of as a judicial/legal bureaucrat 
training institute even though the majority of people who pass through it 
become lawyers, some of whom may wish to become business lawyers rather 
than litigators and thus not need the courtroom-focused training and testing 
regime provided at the LRTI (a regime which makes more sense if it is 
intended primarily for those trainees who will spend much of their career in 
court: future judges and prosecutors). Here it is also worth noting a recent book 
on professional qualifications which asserts that although only a minority of 
zeirishi tax accountants are Tax Agency OBs, those which are can retain clients 
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This reality may be one of the underlying reasons why, 
despite usually being framed in terms of demand for legal 
services and the quality thereof, the debate over the “hōsō 
population problem” is typically conducted without reference to 
the much larger population of other types of service providers.162 
It would probably be politically impossible to have a meaningful 
discussion of the Japanese legal services industry as a whole, 
even though that would be the format that reflected the actual 
needs of the Japanese people. Such a debate would almost 
certainly be impossible because it would involve too many 
vested interests and bureaucratic stakeholders.163  
From the standpoint of bureaucratic institutions, it is 
doubtless much simpler for each ministry to have its own 
profession, thereby limiting the number of stakeholders involved 
in its administration as well as opportunities for inter-agency 
conflict to arise. On a very basic level, the law school system 
developing into the policy disaster it is widely acknowledged to 
  
not just through good service but through the (possibly unfounded) fear on the 
part of their clients that changing to a different firm will trigger a tax audit. If 
this is true, the tacit threat of an audit would rely primarily on the tax 
accountant’s government connections. SATŌ RUMI, SHIKAKU WO TORU TO BINBŌ 
NI NARIMASU [ACQUIRING QUALIFICATIONS MAKE YOU POOR] 120-22 (2014) 
(Japan).  
 162. Interestingly, a June 2013 LDP investigatory committee report 
relating to the law school system includes shihōshoshi lawyers and labor and 
social security attorneys as hōsō in its discussion of the problem because of 
their ability to represent clients in certain legal proceedings, but does so as part 
of a discourse on why there are too many hōsō as it is. See generally 
Jiyūminshutō seimu chōsakai – shihōseidō chōsakai, Hōsō yōseiseido ni tsuite 
no chūkan teigen [Interim Recommendations on the System for Training Legal 
Professionals], June 18, 2013, available at. 
http://www.moj.go.jp/content/000111842.pdf. 
 163. In what the author considers to be one of the most insightful books 
on reforms to the hōsō legal professions and the law school system, bengoshi 
lawyer Masahiro Kobayashi relates an incident at one of the consultative 
committee meetings where law schools were being discussed where one 
member tried to broaden the discussion to include the neighboring professions, 
but was told that it was unnecessary to discuss the subject and it would make 
the focus too broad. MASAHIRO KOBAYASHI, KONNA NICHIBENREN NI DARE GA 
SHITA? [WHO MADE THE JFBA THIS WAY?] 202 (2012).  
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be can probably be attributed to it involving too many 
overlapping jurisdictions and interests. These include the MEXT, 
which regulates universities and was able to acquire a new 
jurisdictional mandate out of the process – regulating graduate 
legal education, 164 the MOJ, which retains control over the entry 
to the hōsō professions through its administration of the NBE,165 
and the JFBA and prefectural bar associations, which are 
unregulated by any Ministry yet whose members have a vested 
interest in limiting competition. The essential problem faced by 
the law school system – too many law graduates (because the 
MEXT licensed too many law schools) sitting for not enough 
passing slots on the NBE – could thus be attributed in part to 
poor inter-agency cooperation. Adding more legal professions 
and thus more ministries to the mix would probably be even 
more disastrous. The term “hōsō population problem” thus 
describes the debate from the standpoint of the various vested 
interests involved rather than the population of actual or 
potential users of legal services. It does not describe any problem 
in the overall population of legal service providers in general, 
since apparently one does not exist. Indeed, the debate is taking 
place at a time when many of the non-hōsō legal professions are 
both increasing in numbers and expanding the scope of the 
services they provide, including into low-level litigation and 
ADR services, as already described.166 These developments go 
  
 164. Somewhat bizarrely, around the same time the law school system 
began operations, the Ministry of Justice assumed responsibility for preparing 
materials for teaching children in junior high and high school about law. 
Promotion and Development of Law-Related Education, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/issues/issues10.html (lasted visited Feb. 23, 
2014). The author suspects that it was part of whatever inter-agency tradeoffs 
were involved in allowing the MEXT to assume control of educating the elite 
legal professions! 
 165. One could include the Supreme Court as a gatekeeper also, since it 
controls the LRTI, graduation from which is a prerequisite to becoming a hōsō. 
 166. An on-line guide to the Law School Equivalency Exam published 
by the test-tutoring academy Tokyo Legal Mind (LEC) shows increases in most 
of the other professions during the period from 2004 (when law schools started 
operations) to 2011. Shihōshoshi lawyers went from 17,667 to 20,313 (with 
those licensed to represent clients in summary court doubling from 6,351 to 
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almost completely unnoticed in the mainstream media, which 
only seems to be interested in the sudden excess of bengoshi 
lawyers. 
While the media frequently uses terms such as the “hōsō 
population problem” or the “bengoshi population problem ,” no 
other providers of legal services seem to suffer from such a 
problem.167 One reason might be that while the NBE acts as an 
absolute control on the number of people able to qualify as 
lawyers, necessitating that the “problem” be debated in 
conjunction with law schools and their educational quality as 
measured by bar performance. By contrast, while the exams for 
the various other legal professions are highly competitive – each 
having a pass rate well below that of the bar exam of any US 
jurisdiction – they do not provide the same role as a “population 
control device ,” since no matter the pass rate on the exam, 
qualifying ex-bureaucrats can always join.  
There is also an important difference in the way the legal 
professions are regulated. While most of the various professions 
have prefectural associations and a national federation, they are 
also ultimately subject to regulation (including sanctions for 
  
13,258), administrative scriveners increased from 37,607 to 41,584, labor and 
social security attorneys went from 27,926 to 35, 864, patent attorneys went 
from 5,654 to 8,684 (with those qualified to represent clients in litigation going 
from 496 to 2,563) and certified tax accountants increased from 67,370 to 
72,039. The growth in these populations compares to an increase in the number 
of lawyers from 17,667 to 20,313 over the same period. Rinsetsu shigyō to no 
gyōsai [Overlapping Professional Areas], TOKYO LEGAL MIND 2 (2012), 
available at http://www.lec-jp.com/yobi_shiken/pdf/about/frontline/2012/ 
frontline03.pdf. 
 167. By way of example, a Google search conducted on August 1, 2013 
for “hōsō jinkō mondai” (Hōsō population problem) generated 145,000 hits. A 
search for “bengoshi jinkō mondai” (Bengoshi lawyer population problem) 
revealed 26,800 hits. Similar searches in Japanese for “Shihōshoshi lawyer 
problem,” “Administrative lawyer problem,” “Labor and Social security 
attorney problem,” “Patent lawyer population problem,” and “Certified tax 
accountant population problem” generated seven, zero, zero and zero hits, 
respectively.  
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misconduct) through their supervising Ministry. 168  Bengoshi 
lawyers are the exception, being the only legal profession that is 
truly self-regulating and independent of the government, 
including in connection with the process of disciplining its 
members.169 While other professions have what might be called 
“bar associations” with professional rules of conduct, those rules 
do not have the same level of import as the Japanese bar rules of 
professional conduct, since bengoshi create their own 
disciplinary rules and are also independent of the government. 
As noted by Ishida in her discussion of the rules of ethics for five 
of the non-bengoshi professions, they “are disciplined by 
  
 168. Shihōshōshi lawyers and Land and Building Investigators are 
subject to sanctions by the head of the local Legal Affairs Bureau. 
Gyōseishoshihō [Administrative Scrivener Act], No. 4 of 1951, art. 47 
(Japan);Tochikaokuchōsashihō [Land and House Investigators Act], Law No. 
228 of 1950, arts. 42-46 (Japan). Administrative Scriveners are subject to 
oversight by and sanctions from the governor of the prefecture in which they 
are registered (jurisdiction over political subdivisions falls under the 
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications). 
Administrative Scrivener Act, arts. 13-(22)—14-(5). Labor and Social Security 
Attorneys are subject to the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare. Shakai 
hokenrōmushihō [Labor and Social Security Attorney Act], Law No. 89 of 
1968 (Japan), arts. 24—25-5. Certified Tax Accountants are subject to sanction 
by the Minister of Finance. Zeirishihō [Certified Public Tax Accountants Act], 
No. 237 of 1951, arts. 44-48. (Japan). Marine Procedures Commission Agents 
are subject to sanctions from the head of the applicable Regional 
Transportation Bureau. Kaijidairishihō [Marine Commission Procedure Agent 
Act], Law No. 32 of 1951, art. 25 (Japan). Customs brokers may be sanctioned 
by the Head of Customs. Tsūkanshihō [Customs Brokering Act], Law No. 122 
of 1967, art. 35 (Japan). Note that the degree of regulation even extends to 
corporate governance: for example, under Article 25-22-2(3) and (4), the 
Minister of Health, Labor and Welfare may express “opinions” in court 
proceedings relating to the dissolution of a Labor and Social Securities Act 
professional services corporation. Id. art. 25-22-2(3), (4). The question of 
whether such opinions (e.g. “dissolution should not be allowed) are binding on 
the court, and whether their issuance constitute administrative action subject to 
challenge under the Administrative Procedure Act does not appear to have 
addressed.  
 169. Under the Japanese constitution the Supreme Court has the 
authority to make rules governing lawyers, though it has not done so. 
NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 77 (Japan). 
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specific government agencies under applicable laws. Their ethics 
codes are merely aspirational.”170 
Thus, to ask whether the law school system and the increase 
in bengoshi lawyers will result in Japanese law and culture 
becoming further “Americanized” (as a 2006 article on the 
subject does) requires ignoring the reality that the Japanese legal 
services industry as a whole is structured in a way which both 
facilitates amakudari and ensures that the preponderance of 
needs for such services are met by providers who are inherently 
incapable of doing so in an adversarial way, particularly vis-à-vis 
the relationship between legal profession and government.171  
After taking into account the extensive range of services 
offered by non-bengoshi legal professions, services that include 
representation and other services relating to low-level civil 
litigation, it is worth taking stock of what is so special about 
bengoshi lawyers. Certainly, they may provide a much broader 
range of services than the other professions. Yet on another 
level, their real significance may be that they are both 
independent of the government and are also the only profession 
vested with the power to stand between the government and the 
people, as criminal defense lawyers or in administrative or 
constitutional litigation. It is thus indeed interesting that 
bengoshi lawyers are the only profession about whom there is a 
heated debate over how few of them there should be.172 Yet if 
  
 170. Ishida, supra note 84, at 385. An additional level of ministry-
specific regulation is also established through rules governing professional 
service corporations, with most of the professions having specific rules for the 
special types of corporations through which each profession may provide 
services. For example, the Labor and Social Security Lawyer Act includes a 
section providing for Labor and Social Security Lawyer Corporations, the 
Administrative Scrivener Act provides for Administrative Scrivener 
Corporations and so forth.  
 171. Schumann, supra note 77, at 519. 
 172. See Hood, supra note 82, at 202. As noted by David Hood in his 
1997 article, “only the interests of the state bureaucracy and the major 
corporations are served by the small size of the bar.” Id. at 211. This statement 
probably remains true despite the “dramatic” increase in the number of 
bengoshi lawyers since the start of the law school system, given that even at 
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one looks at the other legal professions as forming part of an 
overall system of amakudari that “provides channels of 
communication that increase the stability and effectiveness of 
state policy,”173 there is a certain logic to only paying attention to 
the one profession that can be both disruptive and directly 
oppose state action in court. 
D. The Legal Professions as a Source of Indirect 
Amakudari 
In any case, such debate as does take place about the legal 
professions does so within the context of a highly balkanized 
legal profession in which amakudari seems to be an almost 
invisible yet omnipresent feature. In fact, one can find the 
influence of amakudari in the process of qualifying for some of 
the professions themselves. For example, the administrative 
scrivener exam – a national exam provided for by statute - is 
administered by the Administrative Scrivener Exam Center, a 
foundation. 174  While its website suggests that it is simply a 
private foundation, it is considered an amakudari destination and 
when the author first examined the web site a few years ago it 
listed three directors who were formerly MIC bureaucrats.175  
Similarly, the professional associations themselves may also 
employ retired ministry officials. The federations of 
administrative scriveners, public notaries, a number of 
prefectural shihoshoshi lawyers and land and house investigator 
associations, and the Japan Patent Attorneys Association have all 
  
over 30,000 their numbers remain small both in comparison to the other legal 
professions and the population as a whole.  
 173. COLIGNON & USUI, supra note 2, at 113. 
 174. JAPAN FED’N ADMIN. SCRIVENERS, http://gyosei-shiken.or.jp/ (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2014). 
 175. The site has since taken to just listing the names of the directors, 
with no other biographical details, a practice that seems to becoming 
increasingly common with such organizations! Having been researching such 
foundations for several years, the author can attest that the ability to obtain 
information on the backgrounds of their directors has declined markedly just 
over the past few years.  
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been identified as institutions whose boards include ministry 
OB.176  
The law school system itself is also structured to ensure 
amakudari opportunities: MEXT regulations require that at least 
30% of a law school’s full-time faculty have five or more years’ 
experience in practice.177 While this may include lawyers (and 
even a few non-hōsō), retiring judges and prosecutors are natural 
candidates, particularly at private law schools that are likely to 
have a later retirement age than public ones. 178  Of course 
experienced judges and prosecutors may well be valuable 
additions to a law school faculty and many law schools might 
choose to hire some of them anyways. The point is that 
embedding a requirement in regulations effectively ensures that 
there will be a steady supply of law school jobs for which ex-
judges and prosecutors are eligible.179  
  
 176. ICHIIMURA, supra note 21, at 125, 127-33, 147, 297.  
 177. Matter to Provide for the Matters Necessary for the Professional 
Graduate School, Notice No. 53 of 2003, art. 2 [hereinafter MEXT Notice No. 
53], available at http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/koutou/houka/03050102.htm 
(Japan). Note that prior to the start of the law school system, law in Japan was a 
primarily academic discipline taught at undergraduate faculties, with those 
wishing to become scholars going on to pursue higher education in graduate 
programs without passing or even sitting for the NBE. The majority of 
Japanese law professors are not qualified as lawyers and would thus not count 
towards satisfying the practice experience requirement.  
 178. The author qualifies as a non-hōsō practitioner faculty member at 
his law school. By way of example, when reviewed on August 1, 2103, the 
web-site of Yamanashi Gakuin Law School (Yamanashi University is a private 
university) listed 15 full-time faculty members. Of these, eight were listed as 
“practitioners” and included two former judges and two former prosecutors. 
Yamanashi Gakuin Educational Foundation, YAMANASHI GAKUIN SCHOOL OF 
LAW, http://www.ygu.ac.jp/yggs/houka/staff/staff1.html (last visited Aug. 1, 
2013).  
 179. The guarantee created by the regulations being apparently more 
important than the academic freedom supposedly guaranteed by Article 23 of 
the Japanese Constitution. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 23 
(Japan). 
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E. New Legal Professions – the More the Merrier? 
How to expand the scope of activities of the “excess” 
population of bengoshi lawyers beyond the profession’s 
traditional realm of courtroom litigation is currently a subject of 
serious debate within policy circles.180 However, a basic problem 
in such expansion would seem to be that in a world where there 
are already multiple legal professions, the barriers to creating 
new ones before lawyers can occupy a particular legal services 
“space” may not be very high. 
For example, one might consider adding the tochi kairyō 
kanchishi [land improvement and re-plotting specialist]. This 
obscure profession offers opinions regarding plans for 
accumulating and combining agricultural land.181 Its existence is 
  
 180. See, e.g., “Hōsō yosei seido kaigi – chukan torimatome” [Interim 
Points of Meetings to Consider Legal Profession [hoso] Training], Special 
Law School Working Group OF MEXT’s Central EDUCATION, CULTURE, 
SPORTS, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY: JAPAN, http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/ 
shingi/chukyo/chukyo4/012/siryo/attach/1335288 (last visited on May 8, 2013). 
The Interim Points cover three principle subjects, one of which was how to 
expand the fields in which lawyers could practice. The possibilities for 
expansion discussed carefully avoid the areas covered by other legal 
professions and focus on lawyers: (i) joining more corporate legal departments 
(though corporate Japan was largely ignored as possible employers early in the 
law school development process), (ii) becoming public servants, (iii) working 
more with the Japanese legal aid system, (iv) working more with ex-convicts 
after their release from prison and (v) lawyers becoming more involved in the 
overseas business of Japanese companies. (iii) and (iv) are interesting because 
both are under the control of the MOJ, and may have been suggested because 
the MOJ is a stakeholder already involved in the process that might be able to 
help find more jobs for lawyers. (v) is interesting because even though it 
effectively involves lawyers to commit what in other countries might be 
considered malpractice – the unlicensed practice of foreign law – it is likely a 
valid option because there are no vested interests to offend by expanding into 
this domain. The fact that the demands of the NBE – which is focused 
exclusively on domestic law (and mostly litigation-related subjects) - now 
make it difficult to engage law students in classes relevant to international 
business (as the author can attest from personal experience) is apparently not a 
concern. Id.  
 181. See generally RURAL DEV. BUREAU MINISTRY OF AGRIC., FORESTRY 
AND FISHERIES MOTOR SERV. DEP’T LAND IMPROVEMENT PLANNING DIV., 25 
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made necessary by the Land Improvement Act (LIA), a statute 
administered by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries (MAFF). 182  The LIA is aimed at increasing farm 
productivity through the rationalization of agricultural land 
usage, a complex process that can involve the rights of numerous 
owners and users of farmland, a special type of property that is 
itself subject to a byzantine regulatory regime. Under Article 
52(4) of the LIA, before a land rationalization plan can be 
approved the opinion must be sought of a person “having expert 
knowledge relating to the aggregation of agricultural land and 
practical experience in such activities, as specified by Cabinet 
Order.”  
The cabinet order in question delegates to MAFF the 
authority to establish a qualifying exam for the qualification, 
which is only named in this lowest level of regulation.183 The test 
is held annually and consists of two components. The first is the 
law portion, which requires knowledge of the LIA, the Civil 
Code, the Agricultural Land Act, the Family Registry Act, 
recording statutes and other relevant laws and regulations.184 The 
second is a practical skills test on subjects such as formulating an 
aggregation plan and researching land title records. 185  The 
practical skills portion of the test is waived for persons having at 
least ten years practical experience, indicating the qualification is 
likely an option for retiring agricultural officials.186 
  
YEAR LAND IMPROVEMENT ALLOCATED LAND QUALIFICATION TEST, available 
at http://www.maff.go.jp/j/nousin/kikaku/kantisi/pdf/25annai.pdf. 
 182. Tochi kairyō hō [Land Improvement Act], Law No. 75 of 1949 
(Japan).  
 183. Tochikairyōhō shikō rei [Land Improvement Act Implementing 
Order], Cabinet Order No. 295 of 1949, art. 44-4, (Japan); Tochikairyōhō shikō 
kisoku [Land Improvement Act Implementing Regulations], MAFF Order No. 
75 of 1949 (Japan). 
 184. See sources cited, supra note 161. 
 185. Id. 
 186. See MAFF 2013 EXAM NOTICE, MAFF, 
http://www.maff.go.jp/j/nousin/kikaku/kantisi/pdf/25annai.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 31, 2014), for test content and eligibility requirements. The notice is 
careful to make clear that “permitting and guidance” (i.e., administrative 
functions) is included in qualifying for the waiver of the practical skills portion 
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Agricultural land rationalization is a complex subject and 
having a special qualification for those who provide related 
advisory services may be a perfectly logical solution. The point 
is that understanding and mediating the legal issues involved is 
something that bengoshi lawyers could do as well, yet the 
existence of a more specific qualification in the field is likely to 
act as a disincentive to at least some who might otherwise seek 
to specialize. Furthermore, the ability of ministries to create new 
professions that provide a type of legal service would seem to 
limit the ability of existing professionals to branch out into new 
areas of specialization.  
F. Amakudari and the Law; Another Look at Public 
Notaries 
The example of the tochi kairyōshi shows how the law can 
subtly be used to make the involvement of a specific profession a 
mandatory part of certain economic transactions. Since 
agricultural land aggregation is an esoteric subject, it may help to 
offer an example in the field of corporate law by taking another 
look at public notaries.  
Public notaries are appointed by the Minister of Justice to 
serve at specific Public Notary Offices (kōshō yakuba) around 
the country, with each office corresponding to the location of the 
regional Legal Affairs Bureaus (hōmukyoku) where real estate 
title and corporate registries are.187 Article 12(1) of the Public 
  
of the test. Here, some might point out that that retired bureaucrats would still 
have to demonstrate an adequate knowledge of the relevant law, which is true. 
At the same time, it is worth bearing in mind that just as with the NBE itself, 
many national exams exist essentially for the purpose of failing most takers 
rather than passing those who demonstrate an objective level of knowledge or 
skill. See Colin P.A. Jones, Stop thinking – the test is about to start, THE JAPAN 
TIMES, Dec. 18, 2012, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2012/12/18/ 
issues/stop-thinking-the-test-is-about-to-start/#.Ujextj-9Xg4. For obscure 
qualifying exams such as this, that it is used to create the appearance of 
openness while at the same time limiting entry to insiders is a possibility that 
should be considered. See also MEXT notice no. 53, supra note 179. 
 187. Kōshōninhō [Public Notaries Act], Law No. 53 of 1908, art. 11 
(Japan). 
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Notary Act defines eligibility for appointment as a public notary 
primarily in negative terms: those who are not Japanese and who 
have not passed the qualifying exam and completed a six month 
apprenticeship are not eligible. Article 12(2) delegates the details 
of implementing the notarial exam and the apprenticeship to the 
Minister of Justice. Article 13 of the Act specifies that Judges 
(excluding summary court judges), prosecutors (excluding 
assistant prosecutors) and lawyers do not have to pass the 
notarial exam or go through an apprenticeship to be eligible for 
appointment. Article 13-2 also allows as a “temporary measure” 
the appointment of other “persons of learning” as notaries 
without a test or apprenticeship.188 
Although the regime clearly envisions an exam from which 
the stated categories of persons are exempt, the notary exam 
called for in Article 12 of the Act has apparently not been held 
for over a century: public notary appointments are essentially 
reserved exclusively as post-retirement jobs for judges, 
prosecutors and, thanks to the “temporary” measure in Article 
13-2 of the Act, other ex MOJ and judicial personnel. According 
to a report compiled in 2004 by the Japan Federation of Bar 
Associations (the “JFB”), in 2002 there were 462 public notaries. 
Of these, 131 were former judges, 204 former prosecutors, 110 
former Legal Affairs Bureau (i.e., MOJ) personnel, 13 were 
former prosecutorial staff and 3 former judicial clerks.189  
The MOJ is the regulator of the notarial system and has 
jurisdiction over the Public Notarial Act, yet seems almost coy 
when it comes to providing information about it. The MOJ gives 
  
 188. Id. art. 13-2. In addition to the formal requirements set forth in the 
law, some sources still refer to notaries being chosen from persons having at 
least 30 years practice experience, an additional requirement which would 
clearly render the position an amakudari position! See Please Tell Us About the 
Notary Office, NISHOINOMIYA CITY (Mar. 23, 2012), http://www.nishi.or.jp/ 
contents/00011167000200007.html. 
 189. Japan Fed’n Bar Ass’ns, Public Notary Report, ASS’N OF VICTIMS 
OF WILLS AND NOTARIZED DEEDS, http://yuigon.us/german.html (last visited 
Feb. 23, 2014) [hereinafter Public Notary Report]. 
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the total population of public notaries as “about” 500.190 Since 
2002 the MOJ has issued public announcements regarding notary 
position vacancies, though this likely nothing more than window 
dressing.191 For example, the most recent advertisement by the 
MOJ for Article 13 applicants was officially posted for only two 
weeks, with applications being accepted during a one-week 
window.192 The MOJ announcement on Article 13-2 applicants 
also reveals similarly short periods in which applicants with 
suitable experience in public service positions in courts, the MOJ 
or prosecutorial jobs may apply.193 The process also involves a 
written test (if there is more than one applicant for a position) as 
well as an oral exam.194   
  
 190. Letter from Federation of Public Notaries to author (2010) (on file 
with author) (claiming that there were 498 public notaries as of May 6, 2010). 
 191. In May of 2010 the author found on the MOJ website a comment 
directed to the ministry together with the official response. The comment was 
essentially, “The MOJ should administer a notarial exam in accordance with 
the Public Notary Act, opening the profession up to those in the private sector.” 
The official response was essentially that it was desirable to have persons with 
government experience who would be fair and neutral, and that since any test 
would overlap with the NBE it would be unnecessarily duplicative to have one 
given that appointments are already being made out of persons who have 
passed the NBE and have a wealth of practical experience. This comment and 
response have since disappeared from the MOJ website, though the author has 
a printout on file.  
 192. Public Notice Regarding the Adoption of the Notary as Defined in 
Article 13 of the Notary Act, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE (Nov. 6, 2013), 
http://www.moj.go.jp/jinji/shomu/kanbou_jinji14.html. 
 193. For Notary Public Offering of Article 13 2 Bruno Notary Law in 25 
Fiscal Year, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE (Nov. 8, 2013), http://www.moj.go.jp 
/MINJI/minji03_00019.html. Note that the MOJ rules also make persons 
having 15 or more years experience as a Gyoseishoshi lawyers or in a corporate 
legal department eligible to apply. Id.  
 194. See generally Public Notary Report, supra note 191. The Report 
notes that in 2003, five non-government applicants took the Article 13-2 exam 
but none passed, and includes a quote from the Chairman of the Federation of 
Public Notaries to the effect that Public notaries must be fair and have a sense 
of justice, in which respect “civilians” are a more worrisome prospect than 
someone from a court or prosecutor’s office. Id. Thus here again, the testing 
process may function primarily to exclude applicants who are government 
service “outsiders.” See also Tsukanshihō [Customs Brokering Act], Law No. 
122 of 1967, art. xx (Japan). 
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What impact might this cozy arrangement have on other 
aspects of the legal system? In addition to administering the 
Notary Act, the MOJ also has primary responsibility for the 
Company Act.195 Under Article 30 of that statute, the articles of 
incorporation of any newly established joint-stock corporation 
(kabushiki kaisha, the standard corporate form used to conduct 
most for-profit businesses) must be certified by a public 
notary.196 A similar requirement applies to the charter documents 
of foundations and various other corporate forms. Under the 
“Notarial Fees Ordinance” (also under the jurisdiction of the 
MOJ), the fee for notarizing articles of corporation is ¥50,000 
(approximately $500 at current exchange rates).197  
According to MOJ statistics, 80,862 newly-incorporated joint 
stock corporations were registered in 2012.198  Assuming each 
one required the notarial certification of articles of incorporation, 
this works out to ¥4.042 billion in notarial fees. Divided equally 
between 500 notaries, we arrive at a mean annual income of just 
over ¥8 million per notary from this type of incorporation 
alone.199 Whether the certification of articles of incorporation is 
meaningful for any reasons relevant to corporate law will be left 
to specialists in that field. For purposes of this article it is 
hopefully obvious that at the very least the requirement has the 
benefit of ensuring that a category of amakudari legal profession 
is suitably lucrative. Furthermore, primary responsibility for 
drafting the law that confers this benefit on public notaries lies 
  
 195. See Legal Jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice, MINISTRY OF 
JUSTICE, http://www.moj.go.jp/hisho/shomu/syokan-horei_horitsu.html#02 (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2014) (showing the Company Act listed as being under MOJ 
jurisdiction). 
 196. Kaishahō [Company Act], Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 30 (Japan). 
 197. Kōshōnin tesūryō rei [Cabinet Order on Notarial Fees], No. 242 of 
1993, art. 35 (Japan). “For Notary System, MOJ,” 
http://www.moj.go.jp/MINJI/minji30.html (noting that the fees charged by 
notaries are set by this regulation and, according to the MOJ, notaries are 
prohibited from charging any extra or additional fees).  
 198. Ministry of Justice, Corporation Registration Statistics, E-
STAT.GO.JP, http://www.e-stat.go.jp/SG1/estat/List.do?lid=000001110785. 
 199. Needless to say, some notarial jurisdictions – Tokyo, for example – 
are likely to have far more incorporations than others. 
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with the same officials who are likely to benefit from it.200 With 
the mandatory retirement age for notaries set by law at 70, 
persons retiring into such positions are ensured ample 
compensation for years after retirement from their court or 
ministry.201  
Notarial fees also help provide insight into some of the 
systemic costs of amakudari. Incorporating in Japan is 
comparatively expensive, since there is a separate incorporation 
tax that is based on capitalization but starts at a minimum of 
¥150,000.202 This is in addition to the ¥40,000 in revenue stamps 
that must be affixed to the articles of incorporation (unless they 
are filed and certified electronically). Thus, establishing a 
corporation in Japan will cost around $2,000 dollars (at current 
exchange rates) in government-imposed fees and taxes, not 
including any service provider or document preparation fees.203 
  
 200. In August 2013, the author made a formal administrative document 
disclosure request [gyōseibunshō kaiji seikyū] to the MOJ asking for 
information on aggregate notarial fees paid to all notaries in Japan: such a total 
would make it easy to arrive at a median per-notary income. The MOJ response 
was that no total information had been compiled and that while it had 
information on the fees received by individual notary offices, it could not 
disclose them because it would affect the interests of individual notaries. E-
mail from MOJ Civil Bureau to author (Sept. 2013) (copies on file with the 
author). That the MOJ has information on individual notary fees but has not 
taken the trouble to aggregate it for statistical or policy purposes is another 
indicator of possible official sensitivity about the realities of the notary system.  
 201. See Kōshōninhō [Public Notary Law], Law No. 53 of 1908, art. 15 
(Japan). The fact that a prosecutor may have spent most of his or her career in 
criminal court and know little or nothing about title registration does not appear 
relevant to their eligibility for notarial positions. 
 202. Tax table No.7191 registration and license tax, NAT’L TAX 
AGENCY, http://www.nta.go.jp/taxanswer/inshi/7191.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 
2014). 
 203. By way of comparison, service providers offer a Singapore 
incorporation package for under $788 (Singapore dollars), which includes 
service fees, document preparation and government fees. Services and Fees, 
RIKVIN, http://www.rikvin.com/services-and-fees/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2014). 
The State of Delaware charges a basic fee of only $89 for incorporations. DEL. 
DEP’T OF STATE, CORPORATE FEE SCHEDULE (Aug. 2013), available at 
http://corp.delaware.gov/Aug11Fee.pdf. 
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As explained by the MOJ, although they are not public 
servants as defined in the National Public Servant Act, because 
they perform a public function they are considered public 
servants for practical purposes. This status includes being 
immune from negligence liability: beneficiaries of wills rendered 
invalid or other persons harmed due to negligence on the part of 
a public notary must seek recourse from the state under the State 
Redress Act rather than sue the notary personally for 
malpractice.204  
One could thus look at the fees charged for certifying articles 
of incorporation as a form of tax. After all, they are used to 
compensate what is effectively a form of public servant. It is just 
a form of tax that never passes through the public coffers and 
one that only inures to the benefit of a select group of former 
bureaucrats. Whether it is fundamentally different from the tax 
that is effectively being imposed on construction companies that 
have to put unneeded amakudari “advisors” on their payrolls is 
debatable. In any case, public notaries provide a useful 
illustration of one way in which amakudari functions, through a 
law that effectively channels private funds to a specific 
professional group designated by a supervising ministry.  
G. Government Legal Professions and More Amakudari 
The status of public notaries as quasi-public servants is a 
useful segue into another subject that is relevant to both the 
subject of Japan’s legal professions and amakudari. That subject 
is the distinct legal professions that exist only within the 
government.  
  
 204. Notary Public’s Office and the First Notary Public, MINISTRY OF 
JUSTICE, http://www.moj.go.jp/MINJI/minji30.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2014). 
The freedom of public notaries from personal liability for their own negligence 
was confirmed in a 1957 case in the Tokyo District Court. Tokyo District 
Court, Apr. 20, 1957, 8 Kakyūmin 807. It is unclear whether any of the judges 
involved in deciding the case went on to become public notaries after 
retirement. 
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Just as in other countries, a great deal of law-related work is 
performed within Japanese governmental agencies at national, 
prefectural and municipal levels and in all three branches of 
government. In the United States, such tasks are likely to be 
performed by qualified attorneys, starting with the judicial 
clerkships to which many US law students aspire. In Japan, 
many people engaged in such tasks may be doing so with 
nothing more than an undergraduate degree in law (if that).205 
Yet there are also public service legal professions that are 
identifiable by a specific title and qualification regime, 
frequently a combination of testing and training. While the list is 
likely subject to expansion, it would at the very least include: 
Court Administrator (saibanshojimukan), Family Court 
Investigators 206  (kateisaibansho chosakan) and judicial clerks 
(saibansho shokikan), as well as vice-prosecutors (fukukenji) and 
a variety of MOJ administrators (homujimukan, homushō 
senmonnshokuin). The persons performing these roles may 
acquire a high level of legal knowledge, at least with respect to 
courtroom and related procedures. For example, Family Court 
Investigators are sometimes said to have a level of legal 
knowledge at least comparable to assistant judges, and judicial 
clerks prepare documents, conduct legal research, manage the 
court’s documents and may issue dispositive documents such as 
orders to pay or enforcement notices.207 
These types of personnel are subject to the same retirement 
age as applies to other public servants: 60 (subject now to re-
employment until 65). The procurement of post-retirement jobs 
  
 205. The same is true of Japanese corporate legal departments, which are 
likely to be staffed primarily with persons having no more formal qualifications 
than an LL.B. from a Japanese university, if that.  
 206. “Investigator” is the closest English translation. In the Japanese 
courts’ English website these personnel are referred to as “probation officers,” 
possibly because of their involvement in the juvenile criminal proceedings, 
which are conducted in family courts. 
 207. Saibansho hō [Court Act], Act No. 59 of 1947, art. 60 (Japan); see 
also Court Clerk, COURTS IN JAPAN, http://www.courts.go.jp/saiyo/message/ 
syokikan/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2014) (further describing the role of court 
clerks). 
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for these personnel also appears to influence the way that certain 
categories of jobs are allocated, particularly those within the 
judicial system.  
1. Summary Court Judges.  
Take summary court judgeships, for example. In the United 
States, serving as a small-claims court judge might well serve as 
a starting point for a young American trial lawyer hoping to use 
the position as a stepping stone to a more significant role on the 
bench. By contrast, judgeships at Japanese summary courts (the 
lowest rung of the judicial system) are more likely to be older – 
and ex-public servants.  
Appointments of judges to inferior courts are effectively 
made by the Supreme Court’s secretariat.208 Under the Courts 
Organization Act, summary court judges may be appointed not 
only from the ranks of judges, lawyers and prosecutors who have 
passed the NBE, but from a wide range of non-judicial court and 
non-prosecutorial MOJ personnel as well.209 Appointments are 
also possible from a broadly defined category of “other persons 
with suitable experience and knowledge” category.210 As a result, 
  
 208. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 80, para. 1 
(Japan). 
 209. Saibanshō hō [Court Act], Act No. 59 of 1947, art. 44 (Japan) 
 210. Id. art. 45. The appointment process for summary court judges is 
more complicated, with a Supreme Court committee comprised of judges, 
prosecutors, lawyers and others making appointment decisions for candidates 
being appointed through the “otherwise qualified” category in Article 45, and 
each District Court having a summary court judge nominating committee 
comprised of the chief judge of the court, other judges, a prosecutor, lawyers 
and persons of learning, who recommend candidates for judgeships within their 
jurisdiction to the Supreme Court’s nominating committee. Kan’i saibanshō 
hanji senkō kisoku [Summary court judge selection rules], Supreme Court rule 
No. 2 of 1947; see also KAN’I SAIBANSHŌ HANJI SENKŌ TETUZUKI NI TSUITE 
[REGARDING THE PROCESS OF APPOINTING SUMMARY COURT JUDGES], available at 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sihou/kentoukai/seido/dai12/12siryou22.pdf 
(discussing the process of appointing summary court judges; according to this 
document a test is also involved, but parts of it may be waived, and there have 
been allegations of impropriety in the testing process to ensure that only the 
“right” people pass it). See also Noriyuki Imanishi & Aki Komiyama, 
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summary court judges are likely to be former court 
administrators who have amassed decades of experience in court 
practice and procedures.  
Although writing of a time several decades past, court clerk 
turned summary court judge Shuhei Baba’s description of the 
appointment process after the introduction of the qualifying 
exam for summary court judges is worth quoting at length. Not 
only does it illustrate the realities of the summary court judge 
appointment process, but it has troubling implications about how 
amakudari may affect the objectivity of the qualifying exams 
used to control entry into at least some of the legal professions. 
Court clerks and others who had been studying for the NBE211 
flocked to take the exam, which became very competitive as a 
result. Separate from these people, there were executive 
directors [jimukyokuchō] of high courts, district and family 
courts, chief clerks and other managerial personnel who are 
recommended [for summary court judgeships] and for whom 
the written law portion of the exam is waived; about 15 to 20 
of these people are appointed as summary court judges every 
year. Within the courts, the former are called the shikengumi 
[i.e, those who applied to become judges by sitting for and 
passing the exam] and the latter the suisengumi [those who 
  
Saibankan no “uraguchi” ninkan, “amakudari” wo kokuhatsu [Amakudari 
exposed! Back-door judicial appointments], in SHUKAN ASAHI 36-37 (Mar. 
2007) (alleging that the summary court examination process was rigged, with 
“preferred” candidates being excused from the written portion of the exam and 
the subject matter of the oral section being leaked to them in advance). 
“Preferred” candidates were supposedly those who had risen to the highest 
level of administrative posts, such as chief clerk or chief of the secretariat of a 
court. The article quotes an unidentified summary court judge who obtained his 
post through this route: “The courts have their own slush funds [uragane] and 
scandals that they don’t want the people to know about. Can judges who spend 
all their time writing judgments take care of this? Those of us in the 
administrative posts are the ones who have to get dirty [yogoreyaku]. What is 
wrong with us having an amakudari reward?”  
 211. Administrative positions in the court system were (and still are) one 
possible destination for persons unsuccessful in passing the NBE, and some 
might continue attempting to pass the exam while working at the court. 
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were recommended as candidates for appointment by judicial 
administrators].212 
Noting that the suisengumi had less legal knowledge but were 
more likely than shikengumi judges to be paid more, advance up 
the pay scale more quickly and be posted to better courts (i.e., in 
big cities),213 Baba describes how the remaining portion of the 
qualifying exam was “fixed” for them: 
When they were younger the suisengumi were involved in trial 
practice, but having since worked in administration for a long 
time, many had knowledge of basic law and trial practice that 
was not great when compared to the shikengumi; there is an 
undeniably big difference in ability between them and the 
shikengumi. The written portion of the test is waived for the 
suisengumi. They still have to “pass” the oral part of the exam, 
but none of them has ever failed the oral exam. The members 
of the suisengumi “pass” the oral portion because before the 
test the executive director of the high court tells them “for the 
civil portion come prepared by reading this, for the criminal 
portion read that”: he forewarns them what the questions will 
be about.214 
As to the reasons for this odd form of discrimination, Baba 
speculates: 
Why would the Supreme Court treat suisengumi judges better 
than shikengumi judges, despite the former having inferior 
courtroom abilities? The answer is simple. There are two 
likely reasons: 
1. The suisengumi had the opportunity to be appointed as 
summary court judges earlier in their careers but did not do so. 
Instead they devoted themselves to working in the court 
administration (although many may have simply given up 
  
 212. SHUHEI BABA, SAIBANSHO DE MITA KOTO KIITA KOTO [THINGS I SAW 
AND HEARD AT COURT] 45-46 (1999) (Japan). 
 213. Id. at 47-50. 
 214. Id. at 47. 
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after sitting for the exam may times and failing) and serving 
the chief judges of the high, district and family courts who as a 
result feel an affection for them and want to see them 
rewarded. 
2. If suisengumi members who were executive directors or 
chief clerks are not treated well, top administrative employees 
will leave to become summary court judges mid-career, 
leaving no competent workers to assist with judicial 
administration. So it is necessary to treat suisengumi 
preferentially in order to show general employees that they 
can stay in general administrative positions and that even if 
they finish in such a position they will not lose out.”215  
The reasons articulated for reserving certain judgeships for 
retiring administrative personnel may well make sense. Of 
course this means that such opportunities are necessarily denied 
to potentially qualified (and younger) candidates from outside 
the judiciary. 
2. Other Court Personnel.  
The court system also utilizes a variety of other types of 
specialized personnel, often in a part time capacity. These 
include family court mediators (kajichōtei’in), civil mediators 
(minjichōtei’in), court enforcement officers (shikkōkan–
sometimes also referred to as “bailiffs” in English literature) and 
various other roles. These roles have either a higher retirement 
age or (apparently) no formal retirement age at all.216  
Against this background, reports on the re-employment of 
non-judicial court personnel makes interesting reading. The two 
most recent reports are dated of December 2011 and 2012 
respectively and give details as to the court employees who have 
  
 215. Id. at 50-51. 
 216. Mini chotei’in oyobi kajichotei’in kisōku [Civil mediator and 
family mediator rules], Sup. Ct. Rule no. 5 of 1973, art. 1 (Japan).  
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been re-employed after or before reaching retirement age. 217 
Many elected to remain in public service in a similar role, which 
is now possible up to the age of 65.218 A surprising number of 
such employees – generally judicial clerks (shokikan) go on to 
become summary court judges, with others becoming family 
court mediators together with a smattering of court enforcement 
officers and notaries. Virtually all personnel reported left court 
service at the age of 60 or in their late 50’s. 
 
Year: 2011 2012 
Total instances of  
re-employment reported219 
70 64 
Continue in same or similar role 13 14 
Summary court judge 19 15 
Family Court Mediator 16 19 
Civil Mediator  10 5 
  
 217. See generally SAIBANKAN OYOBI SAIBANKAN NO HISHOKAN IGAI NO 
SAIBANSHŌ SHOKUIN NO TAISHOKUKANRI NI KANSURU KISOKU DAI 30 JO NI 
MOTODUZUKU SAIBANNKAN OYOBI SAIBANNKANN NO SAIBANNSHŌ SHOKUIN NO 
SAISHUSHOKU JOKYŌ NO KOHYŌ [PUBLICATION OF STATUS OF RE-EMPLOYMENT 
OF COURT PERSONNEL OTHER THAN JUDGES AND JUDICIAL SECRETARIES PURSUANT 
TO ARTICLE 30 OF THE RULES RELATING TO THE MANAGEMENT OF RETIREMENT 
OF COURT EMPLOYEES OTHER THAN JUDGES AND JUDICIAL CLERKS (Dec. 2011), 
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/vcms_lf/20564003.pdf; SAIBANKAN OYOBI 
SAIBANKAN NO HISHOKAN IGAI NO SAIBANSHO SHOKUIN NO TAISHOKUKANRI NI 
KANSURU KISOKU DAI 30 JO NI MOTODUZUKU SAIBANNKAN OYOBI SAIBANNKANN 
NO SAIBANNSHŌ SHOKUIN NO SAISHUSHOKU JOKYŌ NO KOHYŌ [PUBLICATION OF 
STATUS OF RE-EMPLOYMENT OF COURT PERSONNEL OTHER THAN JUDGES AND 
JUDICIAL SECRETARIES PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 30 OF THE RULES RELATING TO 
THE MANAGEMENT OF RETIREMENT OF COURT EMPLOYEES OTHER THAN JUDGES 
AND JUDICIAL CLERKS (Dec. 2012), available at http://www.courts.go.jp/ 
vcms_lf/H23_saisyuusyoku_jyoukyou.pdf. 
 218. Such re-employment involves lower benefits and status with no 
prospect of promotion. Thus, instances of court of employees being directly re-
employed show them moving to the same sort of role as before “retirement” but 
at a lower level, for example going from being Chief Investigator or Head 
Clerk at a particular court to a being a plain investigator or court at a different 
court. 
 219. Because some of the roles (family court mediator, for example) are 
not full time, data for both years includes a small number of instances of the 
same person being reported twice (by becoming both a family court mediator 
and a civil mediator, for example). 
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Year: 2011 2012 
Foundation220 4 2 
Public Notary 2 2 
Court Enforcement Officer 3 2 
Other 4 5 
 
Of course this information only represents a snapshot of 
applicable ex-court employees approaching mandatory 
retirement age in the years given. Unfortunately, specific 
information is not available on the background of particular 
types of court roles, leaving the researcher to rely on a 
combination of anecdotal evidence221 and such snapshots.222  
We can also obtain a similar snapshot of prosecutorial and 
MOJ officials “retiring” into other government legal jobs; doing 
  
 220. Foundations into which court employees retire include Japan Legal 
Support Center, which effectively functions as the national legal aid system, the 
Hōsō Kyōkai, a foundation related to the legal profession, and the Justice 
Association of Japan (shihōkyōkai -JAJ). See Main Page, JUSTICE ASS’N OF 
JAPAN, http://www.jaj.or.jp/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2014), for more information. 
An interesting example of amakudari relating to this last institution was the 
Head Clerk of the Criminal Division of the Tokyo High Court who retired at 
the age of 60 in 2010 to become the head of the JAJ’s copy department. The 
JAJ was one of the few legal system foundations subject to the scrutiny of the 
jigyōshiwake process, which revealed that 4 of its 11 directors (including both 
full time directors) and 102 of 133 employees were former government 
employees. Among other things the JAJ provides copy services to court users, 
at the rate of ¥20/page for self-service and ¥50/page when performed by JAJ 
employees, rates which the evaluators found to be excessive. Evaluators also 
questioned why JAJ had enjoyed a monopoly on such services for so long, and 
suggested that “Based on the current conditions, it appears that the main 
purpose of the business is to take care of court OB.” EVALUATION REPORT ON 
JIGYO SHIWAKE, supra note 51, at 124-26. 
 221. See Enforcement Officer, WIKIPEDIA, http://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki 
/%E5%9F%B7%E8%A1%8C%E5%AE%98 (last visited Mar. 31, 2014); 
Court Clerk, WIKIPEDIA, http://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E8%A3%81%E5%88% 
A4%E6%89%80%E6%9B%B8%E8%A8%98%E5%AE%98 (last visited Mar. 
31, 2014) (asserting that by passing additional tests they can become court 
enforcement officers, summary court judges or assistant prosecutors). 
 222. Supreme Court response to author’s request for information 
requesting the breakdown of the backgrounds of summary court judges (August 
2013) (on file with author) (stating that no document with breakdown of the 
backgrounds of summary court judges existed). 
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so requires an examination of a different set of reports, as it 
involves employees of the executive branch rather than the 
judicial. That list is the “Public Disclosure of re-employment of 
national public servants, pursuant to Article 106-25(2), etc. of 
the National Public Service Act ,” published jointly by the 
Cabinet Secretariat and the MIC, which has concurrent 
jurisdiction with the National Personnel Agency over the public 
service.223 The 2012 list covers 133 cases of prosecutors and 
other MOJ officials retiring and being re-employed during the 
March 2010-April 2011 period.224 In the interests of space, only 
the highlights will be given, but it includes details about 35 
prosecutors and officials becoming public notaries (with an 
additional three assuming other roles within notarial offices), 
fourteen becoming family court or civil mediators, and one who 
was appointed a summary court judge. With respect to the legal 
professions, one registered as a gyōseishoshi lawyer and two as 
administrative scriveners.225 One also became a full time director 
(senmu riji) at the Federation of Land and Building Investigators. 
  
 223. See generally KOKKA KŌMUIN HŌ DAI 106 NO 25 JŌ 2KŌ TŌ NO KITEI 
NI MOTOZUKU KOKKA KŌMUIN NO SAISHŪSHOKU JŌKYŌ NO KŌHYŌ NIT SUITE 
[Regarding the publication of the situation of reemployment of national public 
servants in accordance with the provisions of Article 106-25(2), etc. of the 
National Public Service Act] 2012 (describing retirement patterns of Japanese 
prosecutors and employees of the Ministry of Justice), available at 
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/houdou/pdf/120907_1dokuhou.pdf. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Seventeen – presumably all former prosecutors – also became 
lawyers. Those who entered other legal professions would have been other 
prosecutorial or MOJ employees who had not passed the NBE. Top prosecutors 
also seemed to do well in the private sector, with one former supreme 
prosecutor becoming an advisor at Nomura Securities, and another picking up 
board positions at two separate companies (Daiwa Securities and an advertising 
company). Although many on this list retired at or close to the age of 60, the 
age range was wider than on the list of court employees discussed above, 
including a number of people leaving government service in their thirties and 
forties. Former prosecutors becoming lawyers accounted for a significant 
portion of these younger retirements. Id. 
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A large number were also reemployed as public servants by 
prosecutorial offices and correctional institutions.226  
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS - AMAKUDARI AS A STRUCTURAL 
PROBLEM IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM AND BEYOND 
So what? 
There may be nothing wrong with court clerks becoming 
summary court judges, MOJ officials becoming family court 
mediators, or retiring bureaucrats of one type or another 
becoming directors at foundations or registering as licensed 
providers of legal services. In many cases there can be little 
doubt that they bring useful skills, experience, and connections 
from their former government employment to their new roles.  
In fact there may well be “good” amakudari as well as “bad,” 
and this article has not sought to distinguish between the two or 
to justify or criticize the institution in any particular context. 
Whether any of the particular modes of legal system amakudari 
serve a useful purpose, are merely forms of institutionalized 
corruption or can be evaluated in other more nuanced terms, are 
subjects that will be left to more focused research by other 
scholars.  
The primary purpose of this article has been simply to point 
out that amakudari exists as an endemic feature of the Japanese 
legal system, one that may exercise a myriad of subtle influences 
on the way the system is designed and operated. It may also be a 
feature of the system that is rarely remarked upon openly, 
possibly because there is little benefit to most people actively 
involved in the legal system to bringing attention to the practice. 
Furthermore, comment may be further stifled by cognizance of 
the reality that insofar as it involves the creation of official or 
unofficial systems of preferential access to employment 
opportunities for ex-officials, amakudari is likely to seem 
contrary to some of the basic principles that people expect the 
legal system to uphold. Finally, researching the subject 
  
 226. Another interesting career transition was the warden of a juvenile 
detention facility who retired to became the principal of a nursery school! Id. 
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systematically may be difficult because on a very basic level 
there is a public, not to mention political, perception that it 
should not happen at all and that government institutions, which 
create and perpetuate amakudari systems – through law and 
regulation – control most of the information yet have little to 
gain from making it readily accessible. 
Having brought the issue to the attention of readers, the 
author will only offer three closing observations on the subject. 
The first is that the prevalence of amakudari and other 
government involvement in the legal profession (broadly 
defined) and public-interest foundations and institutions is likely 
a factor that makes the Japanese legal system as a whole seem to 
function in a much more “pro-government” fashion than might 
be the case in countries such as the United States.227  
The second is that, as suggested by the dynamics underlying 
the appointment of summary court judges described above, at 
least some types of amakudari may reward what I will call 
“internal service” (administering the relevant institution in 
  
 227. According to its English website, the goal of the CHRET is “to 
contribute to the protection of fundamental human rights through 
comprehensive education, awareness-raising and public information regarding 
human rights; research, surveys, data gathering/provision and international 
partnerships on human rights; and consultations on human rights issues.” 
Objective, CENTER FOR HUM. RTS. AFFS. (2011), http://www.jinken.or.jp/en/ 
objective. Yet in its description of the types of human rights issues facing Japan 
today (only available on the Japanese version of the site), virtually every 
“human rights” issue it identifies is some sort of discrimination (discrimination 
against people with AIDS/HIV, elders, non-Japanese people, ex-cons, women, 
etc.). While these may indeed be problems worth addressing, any discussion of 
what are traditionally associated with human rights violations – unlawful 
detention and torture, for example – is completely missing. This is only natural, 
perhaps, given that the MOJ to which the foundation is beholden is responsible 
for the criminal justice system, the immigration detention system and all 
aspects of the correctional system, where most “traditional” human rights 
violations are likely to occur. Guide, CENTER FOR HUM. RTS. AFFS. (2011), 
http://www.jinken.or.jp/jinken-info/jinken-guide. The foundation also has a site 
for children which explains human rights in similar terms, illustrating how such 
institutions can potentially play a role in forming the “rights consciousness” or 
“legal consciousness” of the Japanese people. Children’s Site, CENTER FOR 
HUM. RTS. AFFS. (2011), http://www.jinken.or.jp/jinken-info/daiboken-intro.  
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accordance with the needs of its members) over “external 
service” (providing the public outside the institution with the 
best possible service, perhaps just “public service”).    
The third is that whether good or bad, any type of amakudari 
system involves reserving certain economic opportunities for the 
benefit of people above a certain age. A corollary of this obvious 
conclusion is that it is a system that necessarily disadvantages 
younger people. Whether it is in the public interest non-profit 
sector, entrepreneurship, or pursuing a particular profession, 
amakudari would seem to either overtly or at least passively limit 
the opportunities available to new entrants, most of whom could 
be expected to be younger than ministry OBs approaching 
retirement age. 
For example, providing photocopy services to court patrons 
would seem an obvious area for cost-savings through 
competitive bidding from the private sector, an area in which 
new entrants could seek a competitive advantage through new 
technology or business models. Actually making the photocopies 
is the sort of low-skilled labor that could be done by new, young 
entrants to the labor market. In Japan these opportunities are 
reserved to ex-court employees. Similarly, as already noted, 
acting as a small claims court judge or petty criminal magistrate 
might be an educational entry-level job for young lawyers 
aspiring to a judicial career. Yet in Japan such positions are 
reserved for court employees at the end of their public service 
career.  
Looked at in this light, the various exams for the legal 
professions discussed in this article can be seen not so much as 
“qualifying” exams, but as a medium for limiting new entrants 
from outside the sphere of governments, entrants who are most 
likely to be younger people – while leaving them open to ex-
officials in their fifties and sixties.228  
  
 228. For example, of the 59,948 people who sat for the administrative 
scrivener exam in 2012, 48,788 were in their forties or younger. See Test 
Results Analysis Data, FOUND. ADMIN. SCRIVENER TEST RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 
10, 2009), http://gyosei-shiken.or.jp/bunseki/.  
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Bengoshi lawyers are not an amakudari profession in the 
same way, since the only people who can retire into the 
profession are judges and prosecutors who are already qualified 
to practice as lawyers because they have passed the NBE. 
Nonetheless, the NBE still provides a similar function, only it 
limits the number of younger entrants to the one legal profession 
that does not have an amakudari backdoor rendering it beholden 
to a ministry.229  
In July of 2004 – shortly after most of Japan’s new law 
schools had opened their doors to students – representatives of 
the Supreme Court and the MOJ appeared before a study group 
of the government’s Justice Reform Council. Both were there to 
make their case for retired summary court judges and vice-
prosecutors to be granted a “quasi-lawyer” (junbengoshi) 
qualification that would allow them to practice before the 
nation’s summary courts.230 These proposals were not adopted, 
and Japan’s lawyers have been understandably opposed to 
recognition of such a qualification.231  
Coming as they did just two years before law school students 
started to graduate (the first classes did so in 2006), a time when 
it would have been (or at least should have been) utterly 
  
 229. A few years ago the author participated in a meeting where a senior 
MOJ official was asked point blank whether the NBE was a “qualifying exam” 
(shikaku shaken) or a “selection exam” (senbatsu shaken). He confirmed that it 
was a “qualifying exam.” He was then asked whether that meant that in theory 
everyone who sat for the exam could pass it if they all achieved the required 
score. He confirmed that was possible – in theory. Less than ten minutes later 
he was discussing what the “correct number” of passers might be, nicely 
illustrating the reality that it in reality is a “selection exam” intended to 
generate a largely predetermined number of passers. 
 230. Hōsō seido kentōkai [Summary minutes of 25th session of Legal 
Profession Committee], (July 1, 2004), available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/ 
singi/sihou/kentoukai/seido/dai25/25gaiyou.html. Recall from the discussion 
above that summary court judges are unlikely to have passed the bar exam and 
are thus not eligible to register as bengoshi. See supra Part V.B.1.  
 231. See Statement of Objection, DAIICHI TOKYO BAR ASS’N (2006),  
http://www.ichiben.or.jp/approach/opinion/opinion2006/post-9.html; Statement 
of Objection, YOKOHAMA BAR ASS’N (2002), http://www.yokoben.or.jp/ 
profile/gaiyou/statement/2002/post-21.html.  
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predictable to legal system insiders that the sudden growth in 
bengoshi lawyer population would become a “problem,” the 
request seems particularly galling – at least to someone like the 
author who has spent close to a decade watching the NBE 
regime inflict unnecessary suffering on young law students and 
graduates.  
At the time of writing a legal restriction limited law school 
graduates (or passers of the equivalency exam) to sitting only 
three times during the five years after graduation.232 In 2013, the 
NBE had a pass rate of 26.8% and saw 1,334 takers “strike out”–
i.e. fail for the third time, rendering them ineligible to try 
again.233 So while hopeful young new prospective entrants see 
their efforts frustrated in this way – in part because there are 
supposedly too many in the profession already – as far as the 
MOJ and the judiciary are concerned, any increase in the number 
of legal professionals who are in their sixties, overwhelmingly 
male and well-acclimated to the workings of judicial 
bureaucracies is apparently acceptable.  
  
 232. Shihōshikenhō [National Bar Exam Act], Law No. 140 of 1949, art. 
4 (Japan), On March 4, 2014 the cabinet passed a resolution approving a 
proposed amendment that would allow a person to sit for the exam five times 
during the five year period after graduation. Shihōshiken “gonen de gokai” ni 
juken seigen kanwa kaiseian wo kakugi kettei [Limits on sitting for National 
Bar Exam to be relaxed to “five times in five years” – cabinet resolution 
approves proposed amendment], SANKEI SHINBUN ONLINE, 
http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/news/140304/plc14030412070016-n1.htm 
(last visited Mar. 4, 2014). 
 233. Shihoshiken no gokaku 2049 nin, 53 nin gen, nao teimei [2,049 
people pass the bar exam, 53 less [than last year], still struggling], THE 
CHUGOKU SHINBUN ONLINE (Sept. 10, 2013) http://www.chugoku-
np.co.jp/News/Sp201309100136.html. The three strikes rule was supposed to 
encourage unsuccessful takers to move on with their lives, though technically 
they can try again by trying to pass the law school equivalency exam 
(yobishiken), which had a pass rate of approximately 2013 but which qualifies 
the passer to sit for the NBE three times without graduating from law school. 
“Three-strikers” can also apparently become eligible for another three attempts 
by graduating from law school a second time; how to handle applications from 
graduates of other law schools is an issue that at least some law school 
administrators have had to develop a policy on. 
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As the above vignette shows, amakudari involves persistent 
efforts by government actors to reserve employment and other 
economic opportunities for a select body of older members of 
Japanese society by correspondingly limiting the opportunities 
available to new entrants, who will invariably be younger. As 
this article has tried to illustrate, amakudari is a structural 
problem in the legal system, part of its “hidden fabric” as much 
as it is in the Japanese economy. Given Japan’s growing 
demographic imbalance, with the elderly poised to outnumber 
the young, many of whom are struggling to find jobs, get 
married and raise a family in the face of declining lifetime 
employment in the private sector after two “lost decades,” 
perhaps it is a structural issue worthy of greater attention.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
